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The Second Vatican Council recognizes the existence 
of a legitimate autonomy in the various areas of human 
research and activity. 1 This autonomy does not, however, 
divorce any activity from its concrete context in the life 
of a believer or a non-believer. Faith (or the lack of it) 
cannot but have an impact on a practice which nevertheless 
maintains its own autonomy and should be performed in 
accord with exigencies irreducible to the truths of faith. 
Gaudium et Spes # 38 contends that faith is beneficial for 
any area of human life; the activities of believers should 
deal with any area of life according to its authentic 
exigencies. The products of such a restored activity will 
• harmonize with the natural goal of that area of life, e.g., 
truth in the case of rational pursuits. 
There is, of course, always the danger that non-
Christian practices in various areas of life will influence 
the believer's faith as much as they will be influenced by 
his faith. Thus in the course of a Christian's effort to 
infuse a cultural situation with Christian faith, that 
faith can be corrupted or disfigured by contamination with 
practices or elements of the culture which violate their 
1 
own exigencies and which are therefore also inconsistent 
with authentic faith. Or faith itself can be used in such 
a way that the exigencies of an area of life are violated. 
Historically, the general possibility of distorted inter-
2 
play between faith and the various activities of human life 
has been discussed in the specific terms of the relation of 
faith in the form of theological activity and reason in the 
form of philosophical conclusions. Among the most inter-
esting examples of the interplay of faith and reason may be 
found in the works of Origen and his followers, particular-
ly the three Cappadocians (Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus and 
Gregory of Nyssa), Evagrius Ponticus, and Maximus Confes-
sor. The faith of Origen (especially as evidenced in his 
early On First Principles) is often regarded as a corrup-
tion of Christian faith since Origen propounds philosophi-
• 
cal notions which have since been determined to be opposed 
to Christian faith. Origenism was, of course, condemned in 
the 6th century: 
At the Emperor's command a Council was convoked at 
Constantinople in 543, and an edict drawn up in accord-
ance with Justinian's views giving a long list of 
Origenistic errors and their refutation, which was 
signed by Pope Vigilius and the E. patriarchs. [ ... ] 
The Origenistic controversy was ended by the Second 
Council of Constantinople (553), when Origen's teaching 
was condemned, though it is uncertain whether the 
Council examined his case afresh or simply adhered to 
the decision of the synods of 543. (Cross 1010) 
But if Origen himself is suspect within the Church, the 
same cannot be said for his Cappadocian followers. Though 
Basil the Great and Gregory Nazianzus compiled the Philo-
calia, selections from Origen's writings, they, along with 
Basil's brother, Gregory of Nyssa, are recognized as among 
3 
the foremost and trustworthy defenders of orthodoxy. Among 
the three, Gregory of Nyssa is recognized as the most 
intellectually adventurous, and there are in his works some 
of origen's ideas which were condemned. In view of Gregory 
of Nyssa's interest in questionable ideas and his undoubted 
basic orthodoxy,* his works provide excellent materials for 
a case study of the interplay of faith and the autonomous 
human activity of reasoning. His Great Catechetical 
Oration is recognized as the single best synthesis of his 
thought; it deals with the propriety of divine incarnation, 
perhaps the most difficult issue for a Platonic thinker . 
• 
Therefore we will focus our study on this work. 
Differing Opinions On Gregory's Thought 
All students of Gregory's thought acknowledge its 
Platonic tendency. This thesis is concerned with determin-
* "Lest the examples of Origen and Tertullian be 
dismissed as unrepresentative on the grounds that both have 
been condemned as heretics, the unimpeachable doctrinal 
rectitude of a Gregory of Nyssa may be taken as evidence 
for the thesis that the tension between biblical and 
philosophical doctrine continued to characterize the 
orthodox theology of the catholic tradition", Pelikan, 
The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition Cl00-600), p. 50. 
4 
ing the Christian character of Gregory's Platonic thought: 
is it Platonic in a way compatible with Christian faith, or 
Platonic in a way that is incompatible with Christian 
faith? Many commentators offer views on the degree to 
which Gregory's thought was faithful to Christianity. We 
will first present those which regard the basic orientation 
of his thought as non-Christian. 
1.1. The first goal of H. F. Cherniss' The Platonism 
of Gregory of Nyssa2 is to show, against a claim that 
Gregory is primarily indebted to Stoicism, "the acceptance 
by him [Gregory] of the fundamental metaphysical ideas of 
Plato and his constant adherence thereto" (61); indeed 
"Gregory has merely applied Christian names to Plato's 
doctrine and called it Christian" (62): 
Never does he [Gregory) forget or abandon this firm 
belief that the real world is immateria1, intelligible, 
and ideal. Of this world the soul is a part; there 
is its true home and, striving toward it, thither 
shall it one day return. Moreover, all the Platonic 
attributes of that world are reproduced in Gregory. 
It is beyond time and space, intelligible only to the 
mind, and the mind -- in his stricter passages -- even 
as in Plato is alone eternal. The material world is 
somehow a copy of that real world; it is an image of 
it and it partakes of it. (62) 
Secondly Cherniss is intent on demonstrating that 
Gregory was "willing to abjure intellectual integrity for 
the sake of conservative orthodoxy" (58). Later in this 
chapter (see below, pp. 16-17) we will consider why 
Cherniss is so intent on such a point. His rationale for 
such an evaluation of Gregory's thought lies especially in 
Gregory's explanations of the resurrection of the body; 
such explanations are held to run counter to Gregory's 
otherwise consistently Platonic understanding of the soul 
and its perfection. For Gregory, the soul 
is immaterial and "has no community with the corporeal 
solidity of living bodies" but is connected with the 
body is some way which passes human understanding, and 
at death it goes to the immaterial, intelligible world 
which is its home. 
So much would be clearly and consistently Greg-
ory's doctrine were it not for the accepted Christian 
dogma of the resurrection of the body. (56-57) 
Though Gregory 
has spent so much time adjuring men to avoid the 
material world lest they should need a second death to 
purge their souls of bodily attraction, (57) 
his fidelity to dogma leads him to portray the soul of the 
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dead as standing guard over the elements of its former body 
until, at the resurrection, it "calls them.out" (57) to 
itself. Cherniss comments that 
to descend to such a materialistic explanation of 
resurrection while everywhere else abhorring a doctrine 
which contaminates the intelligible immateriality of 
the divine world shows merely how desperate he was to 
find even a bad explanation for the orthodoxy to which 
he was pledged. (57) 
In other places Gregory "practically denies" (58) the 
resurrection: 
The resurrection is the return to the original state 
of our nature (which as we have seen was purely 
intelligible) in which man was theion ti chrema [filled 
with divinity]. From the body the pathe [weaknesses] 
are inextricable; and once we have shuffled off the body 
we must not expect to find in that other life any of 
the states peculiar to the body. (58) 
Cherniss substantiates his case by noting that 
Gregory accepts a Platonic notion which had not been 
formally condemned by the Church in Gregory's time, i.e., 
origen's universalist notion of salvation (58), though, 
presumably, it is no less logically connected with consis-
tent Platonism than those positions he rejected. 
In short, Cherniss regards Gregory's thought as 
basically a form of Platonism inconsistent with Christian 
dogma: Gregory "invented the means of making Christianity 
an excuse for becoming a Platonist" (48). Gregory's 
thought is compatible with his faith only by violence. 
1.2. A view similiar to Cherniss' was expressed in 
Adolph Harnack's History of Dogma3 : he writes that: 
Gregory's theories also appear to be hampered by a 
contradiction because they are sketched from two 
different points of view. On the one hand he regards 
the nature of man in spirit and body as constituting 
6 
his true being[ ..• ]. But on the other hand, though 
Gregory rejected Origen's [and, by extension, Plato's] 
theories of the pre-existence of souls, the pre-temporal 
fall, and the world as a place of punishment[ ... ] 
regarding them as Hellenic dogmas and therefore mytho-
logical, yet he was dominated by the fundamental thought 
which led Origen to the above view. The spiritual and 
the earthly and sensuous resisted each other. (III, 
276-277) 
Harnack expresses exasperation with Gregory's presentation 
of the Eucharist in realistic terms: 
even such a pronounced Origenist as Gregory of Nyssa 
[ •.. ] as catechist propounded a physiological 
7 
philosophically constructed theory regarding the 
spiritual nourishing power of the [Eucharistic] elements 
which were changed into the body of the Lord, which in 
religious barbarity far outstrips anything put forward 
by the Neo-Platonic Mysteriosophs [ .•• ] in the fourth 
century Christianity was sought after not because it 
offered to men a worship of God in spirit and in truth, 
but because it offered to men a spiritual sense-enjoy-
ment with which neither Mithras nor any other god could 
successfully compete. Gregory wished for a spiritual 
and corporal "communion and mixing" [ .•• ]with the 
Redeemer. (IV, 293-294) 
Harnack, a liberal Protestant "in spirit and in 
truth," regards Jesus as 
a great moral teacher of the coming kingdom [of God], 
the fatherhood of God, the infinite value of the human 
soul, and the commandment of love. All the rest that 
the church has taught about Jesus is the result of 
metaphysical speculation due to the increasing influence 
of Greek philosophy on Christianity. (Gonzalez, 347) 
It is little wonder that Harnack was exasperated with the 
"mystery" character of Gregory's Eucharist. Harnack does 
not give Gregory's thought detailed consideration but would 
• 
clearly regard his interest in the Trinity and the Incarna-
tion as other than authentically Christian in orientation. 
The spiritual orientation Gregory shares with Origen would, 
no doubt, subject Gregory to the same accusation of 
gnosticism as was leveled by Harnack at Origen (II, 341-2, 
346, 360 and 365). 
1.3. Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros4 presents the 
traditional Lutheran notion of the corruption of nature and 
the irrelevance of works to justification in terms of 
contrasting notions of love. He elucidates what he terms 
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the specifically Christian "agape" love and the way its 
distinctiveness has generally been missed by Christian 
theologians. Agape love is God's love, self-sacrificing 
which gives without counting the cost or the "worth" of the 
beloved: "Agape recognises no kind of self-love as legiti-
mate" (217). When the distinctiveness of agape is missed, 
theologians conceive of love as "eros", man's acquisitive 
drive to attain union with God by his own power, by his own 
"works" rather than by faith. Nygren treats the Platonic 
tradition as the preeminent example of an Eros religion. 
The goal of eros is for the naturally immortal soul to 
liberate itself from sensory passions by an ascetical 
ascent into a mystical state of union in which the beauty 
of divine is enjoyed. Nygren identifies Eros religion with 
an egocentrism which is in the sharpest opposition to the 
• Agape religion of Christianity as reformed by Luther. Eros 
and Agape are irreconcilable: one is motivated by either 
one or the other; there is no middle ground. 
Nygren acknowledges that Gregory's Catechetical 
Oration contains traces of an understanding of authentic 
agape in the discussion of the humility involved in the 
Incarnation (Nygren, 430-431) ; but 
It is nevertheless not the Agape but the Eros 
motif that really characterizes Gregory's thought. 
Here we meet the attitude of pure mysticism, with its 
whole apparatus of concepts that were traditional 
ever since Philo and Plotinus. (431) 
Gregory's dependence upon the motifs of "purification" and 
"ascent" to describe the spiritual life are pointed to as 
sure signs that his notion of love (even when the Greek 
"agape" is used by Gregory) is basically that of eros. 
Thus Gregory's thought is unfaithful to Christianity; it 
was an attempt to mediate the irreconcilable. Gregory's 
Platonic leanings determine the shape of his thinking 
rather than his commitment to God's revelation in Christ. 
1.4. Christopher Stead's "Ontology and Terminology115 
substantiates Cherniss' conclusions, though Stead offers a 
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slightly different psychological analysis as to why Gregory 
was willing to flounder in philosophical inconsistencies: 
where philosophical opinions seem to serve his theologi-
cal ends he will press them into service; but he has no 
concern to organize these opinions into a coherent 
system. He lacks the essential attributes of the philo-
sopher - the concern for consistency and the respect for 
truth in all its forms, even disconcerti.llg truth, even 
unprofitable truth. Called to the friendship of Christ, 
he will not, like Aristotle, sacrifice that friendship 
to truth; he believes rather that truth is only to be 
found within that friendship. (107) 
Stead is a clergyman trained in analytic philosophy and 
whose historical scholarship focuses on patristic use of 
philosophical concepts. He finds that Gregory uses a 
number of philosophical terms in inconsistent manners. For 
example, in places Gregory treats the division of creator 
and creatures as the primary division of beings, whereas in 
other places Gregory refers to the division of intelligible 
10 
and perceptible as primary. or, again, Gregory at least 
once refers to a spiritual creature which has moved beyond 
change whereas his overall theory demands that only the 
creator be beyond change. In sum Gregory's use of philo-
sophical concepts is an "uncritical borrowing [ •.. ]he 
fails to take account of variations and conflicts in the 
field of terminology." (112) 
2. Now we will consider authors who regard Gregory's 
thought as harmonious with his Christian faith. 
2.1. Paul Verghese's "Diastema and Diastasis in 
Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction to a Concept and the Posing 
of a Problem"6 is occupied with demonstrating the clear 
differentiation of Gregory's thought from the Neo-Platonisrn 
of Plotinus. He calls attention to a way in which Gregory 
uses philosophy: 
• The question itself whether Gregory was a philo-
sopher or not seems to be awkwardly posed. [ •.. ] 
Distinctions between philosophers, theologians and 
mystics would be unintelligible to this Christian think-
er, who used discourse mainly [ ... ] to lead Christians 
to thinking in accordance with eusebeia or true worship. 
[ .•. ]He used pagan philosophy and the logical techno-
logy and terminology of the second sophistique, but his 
thinking is certainly controlled by and based on the 
faith of the Christian Church [ .•• ].(244) 
Verghese proposes a more fruitful way of questioning 
Gregory's philosophical achievement, part of which we will 
employ in this thesis: 
ask about the ideas and conceptions of reality current 
in his time, both within the Church and outside, to 
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which Gregory was responding. Does he use any critical 
criteria for evaluating, questioning, rejecting or 
reformulating these ideas and conceptions in a Christian 
context? (244) 
Verghese concludes that Gregory's thought differs 
from Neo-Platonic thought in a non-arbitrary manner: 
Gregory's view of the relation between God and 
the world is [so] fundamentally different from that of 
Plotinus or other[s] of the so-called Neoplatonic 
school, that it is not correct to class Gregory among 
Neoplatonists or Christian Platonists. [ ..• ] Neo-pla-
tonic cosmology which presupposes ontological continuity 
between the One and the Many, the Plotinian views of 
time as creation of the soul in its separation from the 
one and of matter as the source of evil are rejected by 
Gregory who must then be understood primarily as a 
Christian thinker who used the categories of thought 
current in his time, and not as a Platonist or 
Neo-platonist. (257) 
Verghese also suggests that there is "a basic 
contradiction in Gregory's thought about the diastema" 
(257), which might be "an unconscious lapse into Plotinian 
views about which Gregory was most of the time rather 
• 
circumspect" (257-258). Diastema refers to distension, the 
dividedness which manifests one's difference from the 
fullness of reality which is God in whom there is no 
distension. Gregory usually treats creation itself as 
distension; however, there are passages in which Gregory 
refers to sin as the origin of distension. If distension 
is a result of sin, then creation itself, which is disten-
sion, is evil in character. Such a view could hardly 
commend itself to a Christian thinker for whom God is the 
12 
creator of the world. 
2.2. Jean Danielou's introduction to his selection 
from Gregory's mystical texts, From Glory to Glory,7 shows 
that Gregory's Platonic terms have been so transmuted as to 
be acceptable within a Biblical world of thought. This is 
often seen in the way Gregory differs from Origen's 
Platonism. For example, Origen holds that the "garments of 
skin" of Genesis 3:21 refer to human embodiment itself 
which is a result of sin. But in Gregory's view 
it comprises all that implies mortality and corrupt-
ibility [and only that]; and man's true nature is to 
enjoy the incorruptibility of the risen body. (11) 
Likewise Gregory distances himself from the 
theory of real preexistence [of the human soul prior to 
embodiment] along the lines followed by Origen in 
dependence on Philo. But in man created in God's image 
he sees the preexistence of human nature in the perf ec-
tion of the divine knowledge--such as it will be only 
at the end of time. (14) • 
Danielou points out a number of other ways in which 
Gregory differs from Platonic thought in principled 
manners. Gregory is said to acknowledge 
Or: 
that the divine nature transcends all determination. 
This is not, however, a negative sort of transcendence, 
like that of the Neo-platonic One. [ ... ]ecstasy is 
linked with the proximity, that is, the presence, of 
God; hence the soul is united with the living God of 
the Bible and not with the abstract essence of the Neo-
platonists. Finally, the most important point is that 
faith is seen to be the only way by which the soul can 
be united to the Transcendent. (36) 
13 
Gregory's notion of Eros has nothing in common with the 
Platonic concept of love--an unfortunate confusion of 
which Anders Nygren is guilty in his chapter on Gregory 
in his book Eros and Agape. [ ••• ] Gregory uses the word 
because he feels that the passionate aspect of Eros is 
a more suggestive symbol for the passivity of the soul 
as it is overpowered by the revelation of the infinite 
beauty of God. (43-44) 
Danielou finds the finest example of Gregory's 
originality and irreducibility to Platonism in his concept 
of change as a positive reality. Both Plato and Gregory 
assert the changelessness of the divine (47), but they have 
different rationales for such assertions. Change, accord-
ing to Plato, is necessarily opposed to goodness. But a 
notion of change as necessarily associated with imperfec-
tion seems inconsistent with the way God is portrayed in 
the Bible as reacting to human choices and needs. Has 
Gregory's use of the Platonic concept involved a betrayal 
of the Bible? • 
Gregory had to destroy the equation: good=immutability, 
and evil=change. And consequently he had to show the 
possibility of a type of change which would not merely 
be a return to immobility--that is, to the mere negation 
of change. (47) 
Gregory distinguishes that change which is associated with 
imperfection from that change which is characteristic of 
human perfection in union with God: 
It is thus a mistake to imagine perfection as a state 
of complete immobility in restored innocence. Perfec-
tion is progress itself: the perfect man is the one who 
continually makes progress. (52) 
A type of change which is a perfection is radically opposed 
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to the basic orientation of Platonic thought. The purport-
edly non-Biblical Platonist Gregory has in effect opened up 
Platonic concepts from within such that they function, 
coherently, within a thoroughly distinct world of thought. 
2.3. David Balas' "Eternity and Time in Contra 
Eunomium"B corroborates Danielou's conclusion: 
whereas in his conception, of eternity (as timeless 
life) and of the temporality of spiritual creatures as 
distended life[,] Gregory's view seems to be close to 
that of Plotinus, his positive notion of this "out-
stretched" existence as (the possibility of) continuous 
progress sets him (it seems to me} very much apart from 
the Platonic tradition. (149} 
Balas in effect responds to Verghese' question about the 
consistency of Gregory's usages of diastema by distinguish-
ing two meanings of distention: 
man has to transcend the temporality of the material 
world and of a human life intricated in it. This true 
perfection, however, does not consist in escaping 
"distension" but rather in a continuous :distension" of 
a higher order. (149} 
2.4. Robert Harvanek argues in his dissertation9: 
Undoubtedly Gregory's effort to create his 
Christian Philosophy remained imperfect in many points. 
He did not always adequately succeed in correcting his 
Platonism nor in expressing the Christian tradition. 
His doctrines call for numerous precisions and even 
some excisions that would be the work of the later 
Christian centuries. But this does not detract from the 
conclusion that Gregory is not a Platonist with some 
Christian accretions. The truth is just the opposite: 
he is a Christian who has not always succeeded in 
clearly reconciling his Platonism with his Christian 
principles. (243} 
He shows the importance of Gregory's notion of creation for 
15 
each of the main areas of Gregory's concern (241-242), and 
It is precisely because he [Gregory] did not rest with 
the [Platonic] distinction between the intelligible and 
the sensible but went beyond and above it to the 
distinction of creature and creator that Gregory was not 
merely a Platonist but a Christian Platonist. It was 
the discernment of this higher and more fundamental 
distinction at the basis of all reality that marked 
Gregory's advance over pagan Platonism. (99) 
cherniss' failure to grasp Gregory's principled differences 
with Plato are pointed out (e.g., 106, 107, 127-128, 140). 
2.5. John Cavarnos' "The Relation of Body and Soul in 
the Thought of Gregory of NyssanlO shows that Gregory has a 
consistent account of the relation of soul and body in 
spite of its difference in several respects from a Platonic 
account. The difference is due, in part, to Gregory's 
appropriation of various Aristotelian concepts. Gregory 
insists, with Plato, on the immateriality, indivisibility 
and imperishability of the soul (64) yet, with Aristotle, 
• 
acknowledges that the soul naturally integrates and 
enlivens its body (65). The soul is even acknowledged to 
depend upon a properly disposed body in order to act. Even 
after death the soul is oriented to its body until, at the 
resurrection, they are united in perfection (76). Those 
passages in which Gregory emphasizes how the body ties the 
soul down are interpreted as moral rather than ontological 
points. That is, evil results from the soul's subordina-
tion of itself to its body (72) rather than using its body 
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in accord with the divinely created nature of soul and body 
(69-10). These views of Gregory are thus compatible with 
the Biblical notion of the goodness of all creation. 
The problem Which Emerges From the Secondary Literature 
It is not beside the point to note that the opposed 
evaluations of the Christian character of Gregory's thought 
are correlated to the various authors' views regarding the 
character of reason and faith as well as the possible 
compatibility between them. Cherniss, Harnack, Nygren are 
certainly not sympathetic to Catholic attempts to integrate 
faith and reason whereas Danielou, Balas and Harvanek are 
catholic. The point of this observation is that one's 
understanding of both rationality and of Christianity and 
of their compatibility affects the approach taken to 
• 
Gregory's texts. Harnack's ethical Christianity provides 
the context within which Gregory's reasoning inevitably 
appears as gnostic and therefore non-Christian. Nygren's 
view of Platonic reasoning as "erotic" and, therefore, 
sharing in the corruption of all natural striving conduces 
to his negative evaluation of Gregory's thought. Cherniss 
displays his own philosophy in the following remark: 
Plato had known the temper of the blade of human know-
ledge and would not bend it to the snapping-point. 
Where the mind of man cannot go with Reason for its 
guide, he let it fly with Fancy; but he always warned 
his readers that of the Beyond he could tell only "a 
likely story." (64) 
And he begins his work thus: 
Reason is mighty for its own destruction. For 
it casts a spell upon men--not to serve it as a mis-
tress--but to use it as a handmaiden. So that faith, 
drawn by the spell of reason, enlists the service of 
this, her natural enemy; and in the final syllogism we 
find a conclusion drawn by faith from reason and the 
contradictory theses of the two incompatible sides of 
human mentality amalgamated to form a doctrine which 
claims to withstand successfully the attack of either. 
(1) 
rt often appears that Cherniss undertook his study of 
Gregory, and that he notices in Gregory's texts only that 
which he did, in order to illustrate his belief in the 
incompatibility of that which he terms faith and reason. 
The Catholic writers, due probably to their assump-
tion that reason and faith can be compatible and to their 
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familiarity with later Scholastic developments illustrating 
that compatibility, are sensitive to points•missed by the 
other thinkers such as Gregory's departures from Platonic 
orthodoxy; as a result they are able to discern a reasoned 
coherence to Gregory's thought that escapes the others. 
Is there any way to pose our question as to the basic 
character of Gregory's thought without begging the question 
by simply postulating a particular understanding of 
rationality and Christianity? In the final analysis there 
is not any such way, but prior to the final analysis there 
is an important piece of work to which this thesis will be 
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directed. We will pursue Verghese's suggested question: 
Does he [Gregory] use any critical criteria for evalu-
ating, question, rejecting or reformulating these ideas 
and conceptions in a Christian context? (244) 
we are going to identify the implicit criteria with which 
Gregory identifies error in the opinions with which he 
deals. These criteria, if indeed there are any rational 
criteria, will allow us to show the direction of Gregory's 
thinking by distinguishing its goal from that to which it 
is opposed. If he has no consistent critical criteria for 
rejecting a particular, e.g., Platonic, view other than the 
fideistic criteria of acceptability to the Church's 
catechetical tradition, then we can conclude that Cherniss 
is correct. on the other hand, if we discern meaningful 
criteria in Gregory's discussions then, whether or not 
those criteria are correct, we will not be able to chal-
• lenge his "intellectual integrity" (Cherniss, 58). 
Our final evaluation cannot do without a notion of 
authentic Christianity by which to judge Gregory's crite-
ria. We will presume the orthodox tradition, as very 
recently exemplified in Vatican II, as the criterion of 
Christianity. To argue for this understanding of Chris-
tianity cannot occupy us since to do so would engage us in 
controversies which far exceed the scope of this work. We 
may mention, however, that employing the Catholic notion of 
Christian faith and reason has the advantage that it does 
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not rule our question out in an a priori fashion. It 
acknowledges the possibility that any particular theolog-
ian's thought can proceed in accord with both faith and 
reason or can fail to do so. Some notions of Christianity 
would regard any theological attempt to use reason as an g 
priori betrayal of Christian faith; our question will not 
be considered worthwhile by such. However, our identifi-
cation of the criteria implicit (or explicit) in Gregory's 
thought could be useful even for those with non-Catholic 
notions of reason and Christian faith. They can compare 
Gregory's criteria with their own and judge accordingly. 
The Distinctive Method of This Study 
This work differs from that of previous thinkers 
especially by the aspect of the method by which the 
• 
critical criteria of Gregory's thought are to be clarified. 
This element may be called "contrastive projection". I 
assume that one ought not determine the character of a 
person's thinking solely from the articulations which he 
achieves; the attempt to do so confuses where he has gotten 
and where he is heading. The latter - not the former -
determines the thought's dynamism, whether or not that 
thinking articulates its topic successfully. 
But can anything be known about the goal of someone's 
thinking apart from his actual achievement? We can know 
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what the final goal will exclude (and in philosophical/-
theological topics this is quite significant), since the 
foils against which the thinker's articulations develop are 
present at all stages of development, whether or not he has 
successfully offered positive alternatives. The articula-
tions sought in theological thinking always bear on (though 
are not reducible to) controversies regarding the meaning 
of being. Where being is at stake the law of excluded 
middle applies. The contradictories of a thinker's 
philosophical foils, and their implications, are necessar-
ily part of the goal at which his thinking aims. Thus we 
can project the character of the articulation sought by 
Gregory, and we can clarify the dynamism of his thought by 
"contrastive projection" from its philosophical foils. 
Our study of the character of Gregory's thought will 
• begin by providing the context of his foils. We will 
present his positive view of his work's audience and 
purpose, as well as his view of the salvational nature of 
truth and its Christological and sacramental dimensions. 
Our characterization of the dynamism of Gregory's 
thought from positive indications will be complemented by 
our characterization from his foils. The latter will be 
less revealing of the richness of his thought; but it will 
highlight the commitments apart from which his thought is 
misconstrued. Positive indications (his own or those 
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implicit in his historical situation) could well be no more 
than commonplaces, parts of his inheritance which, "given 
world enough and time", he would have rejected or somehow 
transposed. For example, should Gregory's works include 
speculative hypotheses which are inconsistent with later-
defined dogma, one still lacks evidence of a non-Christian 
dynamism in his thinking if those proposals were offered in 
the course of rebutting foils which contradict dogma. 
However, if among Gregory's foils is found a proposition 
later defined as Christian dogma, then one has strong 
evidence that the dynamism of his thought is not that of 
Christian faith. In any case, we will seek to clarify the 
dynamism of his thought by a study of both his stated 
concerns and views and of his choice of foils . 
Conclusion • 
We will discuss the perennial topic of the relation 
between faith and reasoning by studying Gregory of Nyssa's 
criteria for philosophical error in his Great Catechetical 
Oration. Commentators disagree whether he has rational 
criteria and, if he does, whether they are harmonious with 
his faith. We will present evidence on the issue from his 
stated views and from his choice of foils. 
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CHAPTER II 
Truth of Christian Faith vis-a-vis Philosophical Error '.I}le 
The present chapter will sketch Gregory's notion of 
the truth of Christian faith and its opposition to error as 
far as can be determined from Gregory's positive statements 
in his Great Catechetical Oration.* His notion of truth 
and falsity will go far toward determining the Christian 
character of his thought. This chapter proceeds in five 
parts. we will first characterize LK's purpose by means of 
a study of its stated audience. Second, we will present 
the main arguments of LK and point out the congruence 
between the organization of the work and its overall 
purpose. Third, we will clarify the salvational importance 
of the truth which LK serves. Fourth, we will take up the 
concrete Christological, incarnational shape-' taken by 
salvation. Fifth, we will consider the ecclesiological 
mediation of the incarnation; this will clarify the sense 
in which Gregory's catechetical work is part of the overall 
salvational process. 
* Henceforth referred to in our text as LK, from the 
Greek title, Logos Katechetikos; we will refer to the 
work's section number and the page reference in the English 
translation by Hardy, "Address on Religious Instruction." 
When changes are made in the translation, Migne's Patro-
logia Graeca (PG) will be cited. 
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aµdiences and Therapeutic Purpose 
The immediate audience for LK is the leaders of the 
church in their capacity as teachers: 
Religious instruction is an essential duty of the 
leaders "of the mystery of our religion." By it the 
church is enlarged through the addition of those who 
are saved, while "the sure word which accords with the 
[traditional] teaching" comes within the hearing of 
unbelievers. (Introduction: 268) 
Gregory alludes to Scriptural exhortations (1 Tim 3:16 and 
Titus 1:9) that the Church's overseers must hand on the 
Christian revelation so as to guard the faithful from 
heresy. The content which the leaders "of our religion" 
are to teach is none other than the "mystery", the revela-
tion which has been handed on in the Church from generation 
to generation. 
The ultimate, though indirect, beneficiaries of LK 
• 
are all those who presently reject the truth of the 
"mystery of our religion". Gregory's stated ultimate 
audience includes Hellenistic polytheists and atheists, 
Christian heretics, as well as Jews. LK is not composed 
for these people to read; rather it is designed to teach 
the Church's leaders the best way to defend the reasonable-
ness of Christian claims to each of these groups. It is 
"in house" Christian literature. 
In what sense will these polytheists, atheists, 
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heretics and Jews benefit from appropriate Christian 
• ? teaching. To the degree that someone is simply ignorant of 
Christian teaching his ignorance can be overcome by a 
simpler teaching than that contained in LK. Gregory's 
concern in LK is those who have already heard the Christian 
message but have not accepted it because they have some 
objection to it. These will be benefited by the correction 
of their confused or otherwise false underlying ideas which 
militate against their acceptance of Christian truth: 
A man of the Jewish faith has certain presuppositions; 
a man reared in Hellenism, others. The Anomoean, 
the Manichaean, the followers of Marcion, Valentinus, 
and Basilides, and the rest on the list of those astray 
in heresy, have their preconceptions, and make it 
necessary for us to attack their underlying ideas in 
each case. (Ibid.) 
Any presuppositions or underlying ideas which prevent 
the acceptance of Christian truth are a form of "disease" 
and a disease of the worst kind - intellectaa1. The 
teaching which Gregory is encouraging in LK will serve to 
heal the intellectual disease from which non-Christians 
suffer; such teaching is a "method of therapy". 
The purpose of therapeutic discussions is "that the 
truth may finally emerge from what is admitted on both 
sides" (Ibid., 269). Thus 
The teaching of the Jew is invalidated by the accept-
ance of the Word and by belief in the Spirit; while the 
polytheistic error of the Greeks is done away, since 
the unity of the nature cancels the notion of plurality. 
Yet again, the unity of the nature must be retained from 
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the Jewish conception, while the distinction of Persons, 
and that only, from the Greek. The irreligious opinion 
on each side finds a corresponding remedy. (3:274) 
In sum, Gregory's intended audience comprises two groups. 
Directly he attempts to help the Church's intellectual 
"physicians" by offering proper therapeutic techniques. 
Indirectly he aids those afflicted with intellectual 
diseases, those whose preconceptions and obstruct their 
acceptance of the truth of the Christian message. We may 
surmise from the sort of objections with which the bulk of 
LK is occupied, objections to the Incarnation based on the 
presumption that the material world is somehow inherently 
evil, that the majority of those for whom Gregory writes 
are neither Jews nor atheistic Greeks but are religious 
minded Greeks and heretical Christians. Jewish topics 
probably enter Gregory's discussion not because he dealt 
with many Jews but because even Hellenists tnew that the 
Christian self-understanding included both a connection 
with Jews and difference from them. 
Contents and Organization 
LK's first substantive discussion is a brief defense 
of the reasonableness of Christian monotheism and Trinitar-
ianism. The former is a stumbling block for Greek polythe-
ists and the latter for Jews and heretical Christians. 
Atheists are to be met with standard arguments from the 
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"skillful and wise arrangement of the world" (Introduction, 
269). The defence of monotheism relies on the commonly 
accepted premise of "the perfection of the divine nature" 
(Ibid.). Gregory points out that since God's perfection is 
unlimited, it can occur in only one instance. A distinc-
tion can be drawn between two beings only if one lacks some 
perfection possessed by the other (Ibid.); thus a second, 
or third .. .', distinct purportedly perfect nature could not 
in fact be perfect. 
God's perfection is also used to establish the 
reasonableness of professing the distinct subsistence of 
the Reason or Word, logos, and Spirit, pneuma, within God 
against the Jews or heretical Christians (1-4:270-275). 
For the divine nature cannot be less perfect than the 
nature of human beings who have a share in reason and 
spirit. The divine Word and Spirit must haTe a distinct 
subsistence with none of the imperfections of human reason 
and spirit. Thus the Word cannot lack the life, goodness, 
or power by which creation occurs and is ordered. 
Some standard objections to the providential ordering 
of creation are then dealt with in sections 5-8. The 
doctrine that man is the image of God is def ended from 
those who object by pointing to the non-divine state of 
man's life: 
man's life is fleeting, subject to passion, mortal, 
liable in soul and body to every type of suffering. 
(5:277) 
Gregory meets this type of objection with the traditional 
distinction between God's basic intention for our nature 
28 
and what has become of our nature due to sinful uses of our 
freedom. The present state of our life is posterior to the 
nature with which we are created. The disabilities of the 
present state of our life are not part of our nature but 
exist only in view of sin. Gregory insists that evil is a 
privation which results from the evil free choices of 
creatures (5:277-278). Gregory presents the view that 
human sin was occasioned by disorders wrought by a sinful 
angelic being (6:278-281). Gregory takes a "transcendental 
turn" so as to clarify why some mistakenly attribute the 
evils of our present life to God: "They define the good by 
reference to the enjoyment of bodily pleasure" (7:281). 
Thereby they misconstrue the origin and character of those 
evils. The non-divine aspects of our life are as they are 
because God foresaw the sinful use of freedom and provided 
for salvation; God's perfection is not overturned by the 
sins of creatures (8:282-286). In this way Gregory meets 
one set of objections made to Christianity on the basis of 
the commonplace of the divine perfection. 
The central topic of LK, the reasonableness of the 
Incarnation of the divine Logos, follows. Once again, the 
commonplace of God's perfection is advanced against a 
Christian claim. For, it is objected, Jesus' birth, 
growth, the natural activities of human life, the suffer-
ings and death, even the resurrection from death are 
"unbefitting a right conception of God" (9:286). Gregory 
proceeds to meet such objections in sections 9-32. His 
arguments work with the general notion that 
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one thing alone in the universe is by nature shameful, 
viz., the malady of evil, while no shame at all attaches 
to what is alien to evil. (9:287) 
He applies this general principle to the various aspects of 
human life which were held to be unbefitting of divinity; 
he shows that they are not unbefitting. Thus the Christian 
profession of the Incarnation of the divine Logos in no way 
implies a notion of God as imperfect. These objections are 
the sort that would be raised not by Jews, who appreciated 
the goodness of the created order, but by H~llenists. We 
can safely judge that Gregory's catechetical work was 
largely occupied with such Hellenists. 
Gregory shows that Christian doctrine concerning the 
facts of Jesus's life makes a reasonable case that he is 
not an ordinary mortal but is divine (12-13: 289-290, 
32:311). Furthermore, the facts of the history of the 
destruction of idolatry and of Judaism (18-19:295-296) are 
adduced as further evidence of the Christian claim regard-
ing Jesus. These latter points would have had no small 
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impact in Gregory's time since Julian (the apostate) ruled 
only two decades earlier (361-363). Julian's 
policy was to degrade Christianity and promote paganism 
by every means short of open persecution. He sought to 
re-establish the heathen worship throughout the empire; 
ordered all instruction in the Imperial schools to be 
completely paganized [ .•. ]. He also attempted to weaken 
the Church internally by allowing all exiled Bishops to 
return to their sees with a view to created dissensions. 
(Cross 765) 
He also attempted to rebuild Jerusalem for the Jews as a 
means of discrediting the standard Christian argument. 
Julian, of course, died and the emperors were, at the time 
of the composition of LK, orthodox Christians. Nonethe-
less, Julian's attempt was no doubt frightening. 
The objections to the Incarnation did not rely solely 
on the premise of the evilness of the bodily dimension of 
human nature. Another major objection relied on the notion 
that God's power should not need an incarnation in order to 
• 
accomplish the intended salvation: 
Why did he [God) take a tedious, circuitous route, 
submit to a bodily nature [ ••• ]? Could he not have 
remained in his transcendent and divine glory, and 
saved man by a command, renouncing such circuitous 
routes? (15:291) 
Gregory met this objection with the notion of the devil's 
due, that salvation was effected without violating the 
human sinful choice to surrender to the devil. The devil's 
"rights" in the matter were respected by God, who effected 
salvation from within the effects of those choices, by 
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entering into death (21-26:298-304). 
other standard objections are met by Gregory in 
standard ways. Why did God wait so long to save us? So 
that evil could reach its "highest pitch" (29:307). Why do 
not all believe? Some hold aloof from the gospel "of their 
own free choice" (30:309). 
Sections 33-40 end the work with a consideration of 
the particular rituals by which one enters and lives in the 
church, baptism and the Eucharist. Many of the objections 
regarding the reasonableness of the Incarnation recur 
regarding the reasonableness of using creaturely rituals as 
bearers of salvation. How can water or bread and wine make 
a difference affecting salvation? Gregory's response 
relies on the fidelity of God in Christ to his promises, to 
"be present with those who call upon him" (34:313), and the 
power of God to use material elements to bri'hg about new 
life (34:314). Gregory brings out the connections between 
the incarnation and the sacraments. 
The proper manner of taking part in the sacraments is 
also dealt with. One should accept them in their Trinitar-
ian sense (38-39:321-323) lest one commit oneself to a 
religion unable to give salvation. In conclusion, Gregory 
stresses that one's life must give evidence of the change 
which is offered in baptism. 
LK's purpose was, as was pointed out, to help people 
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overcome the objections which keep them from entering the 
church and enjoying salvation. The movement of the book is 
appropriate to such a purpose; that movement can be 
described as a process of concretization, of identifying 
and defending the various dimensions which are constitutive 
of right minded acceptance of baptism and Christian life. 
Immediately following the introduction's statement of the 
overall goal, the least tangible though most decisive topic 
is dealt with: the Trinitarian character of God as the 
presupposition of salvation. The book concludes with the 
most tangible dimension of Christian life: the sensibly 
observable sacramental events and the sensibly observable 
changes in the Christian's life (or the lack thereof). The 
discussion of these tangible events is not unrelated to the 
discussion of the Trinity. For one of the characteristics 
of a right minded baptism (a baptism which aan divinize) is 
that the one being baptized is participating in the rite as 
an entry into divine life. For acceptance of baptism in 
the name of a Son and Spirit which are acknowledged as 
non-divine, would be participation in a rite which, of its 
nature, could not divinize. 
In between the least and the most tangible topics, 
the topic which had tangibility about it and yet is not now 
directly tangible is dealt with: the Incarnation. The 
discussion of the Incarnation is clearly also related to 
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the discussion of the Trinity and of baptism and Church 
life. For it is baptism into an incarnate one who is 
within the Trinity by nature that can divinize. Without 
the Incarnation, knowledge of the Trinity would be fruit-
less, since the divine life itself would not be present in 
a form accessible to us. Nor would knowledge of the 
Trinity and the fact of the Incarnation be of great 
importance, apart from the tangible means by which persons 
can share in the life of the incarnated one and thereby of 
the Trinity. 
In sum, LK is exploring and justifying Christian 
views regarding the various constitutive elements of human 
divinization or salvation. The work circles from its 
general introductory statement regarding salvation to its 
final consideration of the particular ways in which 
salvation is realized. • 
We will now expand on LK's themes which are pertinent 
to determining whether Gregory's criteria for philosophical 
error are reasonable. 
Salvation as the Purpose of Truth 
We may begin by clarifying Gregory's view that the 
Christian message is such that one's relation to it serves 
as an indicator of the health of one's intellectual 
presuppositions. Why are preconceptions which are opposed 
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to acceptance of the Christian message referred to as a 
form of disease? What is so diseased about the polythe-
ist's opposition to God's unity, or the Jew's and heretical 
Christian's denial of the consubstantiality of the Logos 
and spirit? Why are these rather abstract matters, about 
which Gregory teaches, so terribly important? 
The purpose of teaching the truth by those who are 
leaders in the Church is that "the Church is enlarged 
through the addition of those who are saved" (Ibid., 268). 
salvation is at issue, and salvation within the present 
status of the world takes the form of life in the Church. 
Before we discuss the ecclesial dimension of salvation, we 
must clarify Gregory's notion of salvation and its absence. 
Salvation, according to Gregory, is a share in the 
restorationl of man to the divinization intended2 in 
creation. What does God intend in creation?-
God the Word and Wisdom and Power created human 
nature. He was not, indeed, driven by any necessity 
to form man; but out of his abundant love he fashioned 
and created such a [living) creature. For (neither 
should the) light[ •.. ] remain unseen, (n)or [the) 
glory unwitnessed, (n)or [his) goodness unenjoyed, [n)or 
[ ... ] (should] any[ .•. ] aspect we observe of the divine 
nature [ ••• ] lie idle[,] with no one to share or enjoy 
it . ( 5 : 2 7 6 ; PG 4 5 , 21 BC) 
Human beings are created to enjoy nothing less than God's 
own goodness which is infinite and perfect; they are to 
enjoy and "participate in the divine goodness." (Ibid.) 
Yet all who live in the world are confronted by the 
non-divine status of our present life. In many respects 
the present state of the world fails to image God: 
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where is the soul's likeness to God? Where is the 
body's freedom from suffering? Where is the 
eternal[ness of] life? Man's life is fleeting, subject 
to passion, mortal, liable in soul and body to every 
type of suffering. (5:277; PG 45, 24B) 
The present state of the world is that of an "unnatural 
condition" (Ibid.). But the present state of life is not 
an argument against its origination by God: 
The fact that human life is at present in an 
unnatural condition is insufficient proof that man was 
never created in a state of goodness. [ ..• ] The cause of 
our present condition and of our being deprived of our 
former preferable state is to be found elsewhere [than 
in God]. (Ibid.) 
And 
It was by a movement of free will that we became 
associated with evil. [ ••• ] By this means we fell from 
that blessed state we think of as freedom from passion, 
and were changed into evil. (8:282) 
In short • 
It is the height of shortsightedness to call God 
the author of evil because of the body's sufferings, 
which are a necessary accompaniment of our fluctuating 
nature. (8: 285) 
Divinization, in the situation brought about by sin, 
takes the form of salvation from the unnatural, fluctuating 
condition of the present state of life. The fullness of 
salvation must involve the complete "restoration" of our 
nature. In the midst of our present unnatural condition, 
salvation means that we enjoy some share in our "natural" 
36 
condition. The life of the Church makes such salvation 
available. But our entire makeup conduces to salvation in 
many ways. Even death plays a role in our salvation: 
the creator of our vessel, I mean our sentient and 
bodily nature, when it became mingled with evil, 
dissolved the material [i.e., allowed us to die] which 
contained the evil. And then, once it has been freed 
from its opposite, he will remold it by the resur-
rection, and will reconstitute the vessel into its 
original beauty. (8:284) 
The fullness of salvation, in order to meet the full 
problem as has been described, must involve our restoration 
to the enjoyment of truth, to life in justice and love, to 
liberation from passions (i.e., de-personalizations in 
embodiment and affections), and to resurrected immortality. 
Gregory presumes that the salvation offered in the 
Church's life is a great good. Among the great goods of 
this life are its beliefs. Thus Gregory is preoccupied 
~ 
with showing that Christian beliefs are credible on the 
common ground accepted by his audience, the ground of 
reason. This is the context in which to clarify how the 
opinions of the polytheists, non-Trinitarian Christians and 
Jews are at odds with the salvation which is available in 
the Church. Gregory does not explicitly attempt to prove 
that salvation is only attainable within the Church nor 
does he determine precisely what dimension of human health 
is excluded by each of the non-Christian opinions. We may, 
nevertheless, suggest the following lines of reasoning as 
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approaches to clarifying the sense in which the non-Christ-
ian views are diseased. 
The polytheistic denial of the origin of all things 
in one all good, all powerful God has among its implica-
tions the impossibility of any radical overcoming of the 
non-divine characteristics of our present world. A 
consistent polytheist will regard the present status of our 
world as the whole and final story. This could (or perhaps 
should) lead to a despair or a foolhardy (because doomed) 
heroism. 
Heretical Christians and Jews accept that God is the 
origin of the entire world and is omnipotent. Thus they 
can consistently hope that God can right the wrongs of the 
present status of the world. But their denial of the 
divine consubstantiality of the differentiated subsistent 
Logos and Pneuma implicitly includes a denia~ that the 
divine reality itself can be shared with others. For it is 
by means of his Logos (and Pneuma) that God relates to us. 
But if the closest thing to God which is accessible within 
our experience, the Logos, is not of the divine nature, 
then God's nature itself is inaccessible to us; we cannot 
share in it. On the other hand, if the Logos is naturally 
involved in the divine life, then that life may be shared. 
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Furthermore, since Logos is a relational term* 
(l:272), the consubstantiality of the Logos means that 
divinity itself involves relationships. If the divine 
nature involves relations, then there is nothing about the 
divine nature which would make divinization of creatures 
impossible. If one of the natural participants in the 
divine relationships can take on our nature without 
diminution (without losing its divinity), then it is not 
impossible that we who are not divine by nature could share 
in the divine life. The heretical Christian and Jewish 
views, however, exclude subsistent relations from the 
divine reality. On such views the divine nature would be 
contaminated if it were mixed with other reality or 
realities; such a mixing would be unworthy of and impos-
sible for God. To attribute such to God would be to treat 
God as less exalted and transcendent than hQ is and that 
would be to deprive God of his due. We, then, would have 
to regard God's transcendence of our world as a transcen-
dence which is necessarily closed to our participation. 
Whatever "logos" or "pneuma" from God there may be in our 
world, would not literally be divine, and could not mediate 
* Gregory's fellow Cappadocian, Gregory of Nazianzus, 
treats the hypostases of the Father, Logos, and Pneuma as 
neither essences nor actions; rather they are relations 
(Third Theological Oration, # 16; Hardy: 171). Neither are 
they substances nor attributes of substances (Fifth 
Theological Oration, # 6 and 9; Hardy: 197 and 199). 
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human deification. 
It would be fully in harmony with Gregory's thought 
to suggest that such notions of life, and the God implied 
in them, are restricted in ways that even we in our present 
intellectual state can understand. Precisely since God 
should be given his due, such restrictions ought not be 
accepted without compelling reason. Reason is rather on 
the side of rejecting the heretical or Jewish restrictions 
and treating God in the Christian fashion as quite capable 
of sharing his own life with us, of divinizing us. 
Christ's Incarnation and Salvation 
Gregory does not leave the discussion of divinization 
in the abstract but clarifies the concrete shape taken by 
the process: 
If you exclude from life the benefits whieh come from 
God, you will have no way of recognizing the divine. 
It is from the blessings we experience that we recog-
nize our benefactor, since by observing what happens 
to us, we deduce ["infer") the nature of Him who is 
responsible for it. (15:290; PG 45, 48A) 
Or again, "A good purpose [ ... ] cannot be detected in the 
abstract" (20:297). Gregory clarifies the concrete form in 
which divinization becomes possible and available: 
To whom did it belong to raise him [man] up when he had 
fallen, to restore him when he was lost, to lead him 
back when he had gone astray? To whom, but to the very 
Lord of his nature? For only the one who had origin-
ally given him life was both able and fitted to restore 
it [even] when it was lost. This is what the revelation 
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of the truth teaches us, when we learn that God origin-
ally made man, and saved him when he had fallen (S:2S6; 
PG 45, 40C; the bracketed word is omitted in Hardy's 
translation) 
salvation is possible only by the power of one who was 
involved in the creation of our nature (1:271-272) and only 
by the presence of that power within our nature: 
•.• how could our nature be restored [if, while an earth-
ly being was sick, another being, from heaven, had been 
united with the divine]. (27:305; PG 45, 72AB; bracketed 
words differ from Hardy's translation) 
The divinity must be united with every dimension of our 
life, including even our death: 
For he who eternally exists did not submit to being 
born in a body because he was in need of life. Rather 
was it to recall us from death to life. Our whole 
nature had to be brought back from death. In conse-
quence he stooped down to our dead body and stretched 
out a hand, as it were, to one who was prostrate. 
(32:310) 
The point of the incarnation of divinity in our human 
nature is that our life as a whole might be ~estored to the 
ideal in which we were created and thereby share in 
divinity: 
The manner of our salvation owes its efficacy less to 
instruction by teaching than to what He who entered 
into fellowship with man actually did. [He actualized 
life in deed], so that by means of the flesh which 
he assumed and thereby deified salvation might come 
to all that was [of the same kind]. (35:314, PG 45, 
SSA; bracketed words differ from Hardy's translation) 
This incarnation can be recognized when it occurs by 
the character of the deeds which the Incarnate One per-
forms: 
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It is a mark of God to give man life; to preserve 
by his providence all existing things; to afford food 
and drink to those who have been granted life in the 
flesh; to care for those in want; by health to restore 
to itself the nature perverted by sickness; to exercise 
an equal sway over all creation [ ... ], and above all to 
be the vanquisher of death and corruption. If, then, 
the record ["histories," i.e., the Scriptures) about him 
[Jesus, the purported incarnate Logos) were defective 
in any of these or suchlike things, unbelievers would 
have good reason to take exception to our religion. But 
if everything by which we know God is evident in the 
record ["what we are told"] about him, what stands in 
the way of believing? (12:289; PG 45, 44D-45A) 
The incarnation of the divine Logos makes nothing 
less than salvation possible. Polytheists and even 
heretical Christians may well admire Jesus as an "intermed-
iary" divine being, one who greatly exceeds mere human 
nature without being of the substance of the ultimate God. 
We may know of Jews who regard Jesus as a prophet or an 
esteemed rabbi. Gregory points out that regarding Jesus as 
less than one in nature with God cannot lead to the fruit 
• 
of salvation. This can be seen in Gregory's treatment of 
the character of Jesus which justifies acceptance of 
baptism in his name: 
If, then, man is a created being and he thinks of 
the Spirit and the only-begotten God as similarly 
created, he would be foolish to hope for a change for 
the better [by accepting baptism in them and thus 
communion with them], when he is only reverting to his 
own nature. [ •.. ] if a man does not ally himself with 
the uncreated nature, but with the creation which is 
akin to him and shares his bondage, his is not the 
birth from above. But the gospel says [Cf. John 3:3) 
that the birth of those who are saved is from above. 
(39:323) 
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If one of the uncreated nature itself is not incarnate, 
then we are not saved. One who denies the possibility of 
such incarnation, either by holding that no Logos which is 
accessible to us can be subsistent within God or by holding 
that a subsistent Logos within God cannot be united with 
our nature, denies the possibility of salvation. 
Eaith as the Attitude of Salvation 
Gregory's view of the nature of and need for faith, 
though treated only in passing in LK, is essential for our 
understanding of the diseased character of the non-Christ-
ian opinions. We may well wonder why possession of the 
false opinions of Jews, polytheists and heretical Chris-
tians, even about important issues, wounds one's enjoyment 
of life? What practical difference is there? Crucial to 
an answer is Gregory's notion of God's respeet for our 
freedom; God does not coerce us into sharing his life. 
Human freedom and intellect are involved in divinization in 
the form of faith. Divinization does not occur apart from 
human faith. 
The incarnation and our knowledge of it in faith 
makes a difference because human beings are the sort of 
things which are designed to cooperate in an active way in 
the realization of God's creative generosity: 
If, then, man came into being for these reasons, 
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viz., to participate in the divine goodness, he had to 
be fashioned in such a way as to fit him to share in 
this goodness. For just as the eye shares in light 
through having by nature an inherent brightness in it, 
and by this innate power attracts what is akin to 
itself, so something akin to the divine had to be 
mingled with human nature. In this way its desire [for 
divine goodness] would correspond to something native 
to it. ( 5: 2 7 6) 
And furthermore, that which 
is in every respect made similar to the divine, must 
certainly possess free will and liberty by nature, so 
that participation in the good may be the reward of 
virtue. (5:277) 
Not even divinization occurs in human beings against their 
knowledge and will. The human powers of understanding and 
free choice operate not only with reference to the material 
things of the world; they are even pertinent to the 
spiritual life: 
(all the other living creatures] owe their existence to 
the impulse of their parents; but spiritual birth is in 
the control of the one born. Since, then, everyone has 
a choice in this matter and there is a danger of acting 
unwisely, it is well, I think, for one initiating his 
own (spiritual] birth to think out in advance whom it 
is well to have as a father and from what it is best 
that his nature should consist. For, as I have said, 
in such a birth one is free to choose one's own parents. 
(39:321; PG 45, 970-lOOA) 
Man's attitude is decisive for his salvation or 
fallenness. Any attitude which is devoted to creatures 
rather than the creator is self-dooming. By definition it 
involves a restriction in the goodness which can possibly 
be enjoyed. A priori it is closed to divinization, 
immortality, and freedom from passions. 
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.Among the attitudes which are hopeless (literally in 
the final analysis) is that which takes as real and good 
onlY that which can be sensed or intellectually comprehend-
d Human knowing, according to Gregory, always involves e . 
both sensory and intellectual aspects. Nevertheless, 
sensation and intellection are very different; since God is 
by nature non-material, he can only be known about and 
known intellectually. But human sensation and intellection 
have in common that they are equally created powers. Our 
intellection is no more a positive instrument by which to 
construct or comprehend divine reality than is our sensa-
tion. Our cognitional power is adequate to divine reality 
in only one sense; it suffices for us to accept and enjoy 
an unceasingly deepening participation in the divine life 
(5:276). 
The attitude which is hopeful (i.e., wnich hopes for 
and accepts its fulfillment by the saving, divinizing 
incarnation) is the only attitude in which divinization is 
actually able to be enjoyed. It is the intellectual and 
volitional willingness to accept communion in the revela-
tion which comes from divinity and which is divine in 
substance. This is the attitude known as faith, without 
which there is no salvation: 
we have thought it well to limit ourselves to what the 
gospel has to say about faith, viz., that he who is 
born by spiritual rebirth recognizes[*] by whom he is 
born, and what kind of creature he becomes. For this 
is the only kind of birth where we can choose what we 
are to become. (38:321) 
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It must be stressed that, according to Gregory, faith 
is not an abdication of intellect. In truth, it is the 
roost fully developed, open-minded exercise of intellect 
possible.# 
Nor is faith merely an intellectual affair. Faith 
involves one's will as well. Far from involving an 
abdication of one's capacity for willing, faith realizes 
the highest, most "will-full" case of willing possible; it 
culminates in love. 
The character of faith can be clarified by contrast-
ing it with lower ways of using intellect and, by exten-
sion, will. Creaturely powers, even of beings higher than 
human, are not divine by nature. Our intellect, by its own 
• 
power, can produce concepts regarding those dimensions of 
reality which are comprehensible to us. If the divine were 
"accessible" (27:305) as the object at the end of our 
* Danielou, 35, quotes from Gregory's Against Eunom-
ius: "there is no other way of drawing near to God than by 
the intermediary of faith; it is only through faith that 
the questing soul can unite itself with the incomprehen-
sible Godhead." 
# Danielou, 31, quotes from Gregory's Commentary on 
the Canticle of Canticles: "when I gave up every finite 
mode of comprehension, then it was that I found my Beloved 
by faith." 
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productive intellectual development, God would not be 
radically transcendent to us; he would be much higher than 
us, but the difference would be measureable. God would be 
more accessible to the more spiritually developed or more 
purely spiritual elements in creation. We could achieve a 
sort of divinization by strenuous and pure intellectual 
activity, while jettisoning our less spiritual, bodily 
dimension. 
But this "productive" knowledge of the comprehensible 
dimensions of reality does not saves us in our bodily-
spiritual integrity. Nor is it sufficient to effect 
divinization. The realities grasped in such knowledge are 
inherently creaturely and do not even exhaust the concrete 
reality of creatures. Such knowledge does not actualize 
the full potentialities of our intellectual and volitional 
powers. Nor is any knowledge which can be achieved by 
intellectual creatures higher than human, adequate to God. 
That which is accessible to creaturely intellectual powers 
is not God, since God, 
by reason of his transcendent nature, is unapproachable. 
[ ..• ] For what is totally inaccessible is not accessible 
to one thing and inaccessible to another. [ ... ] 
The true way[ ... ] of regarding the transcendent 
dignity does not have in view comparisons in terms of 
"lower" and "higher." (27:305-306) 
Faith is the highest actualization, by God's grace, 
of our creaturely powers of intellection and volition. But 
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it is a form of reception rather than an attempt to 
approach the "unapproachable" under our own power.3 Our 
intellect and will are perfected only in accepting the 
self-presenting approach of the unapproachable in the 
incarnate Logos. The incarnate Logos is the "object" for 
which the attitude of faith is the receptive capacity. It 
is for faithful acceptance of the Logos that the powers of 
intellect and will are created. The incomprehensibility of 
the object of faith does not mean that it is unknowable. 
Rather, the incarnate Logos exceeds that which created 
intellect can produce, duplicate, or approach by its own 
power.4 As inherently "excessive," it is the type of 
object by which divinization is possible. The incarnate 
presence of the incomprehensible divine nature (that 
presence as mediated by ecclesial realities) releases our 
powers into unceasing change for the good.5 •There is no 
good reason for the intellect to settle for less* (i.e. for 
any creature or, even less, for the comprehensible dimen-
sions of creatures). There is no good reason for the 
intellect to refuse faith and faith's flower, love. 
This should allow us to understand why the false 
assumptions of the polytheists and heretical Christians are 
* Danielou, 52, includes a quote from Gregory's On 
Perfection: " ••. perfection consists in our never stopping 
in our growth in good, never circumscribing our perfection 
by any limitation." 
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of such concern to Gregory. The salvation and divinization 
of these people, for which God creates them, are at stake. 
They cannot enjoy that participation in the divine life 
while their attitudes are trapped in assumptions which shut 
out the possibility of accepting the incarnation. Their 
minds are self-thwarting. This is the disease for which 
Gregory is prescribing the cure of solid teaching. The 
ecclesial context of solid teaching is our next topic. 
The sacramental/Ecclesial Dimension 
Gregory presents the sacraments as ways by which 
Jesus' promise "always to be present" with us (34:313) is 
fulfilled. The spread of salvation made possible by the 
incarnation of the divine Word takes the concrete form, as 
was mentioned earlier, of the enlargement of the Church.* 
The Church is the community which mediates t~e divinization 
brought by the incarnate Logos. Entry into the Church, and 
thereby into the milieu of divinization, occurs in the 
right-minded acceptance (acceptance in faith) of baptism 
and the eucharist. Gregory speaks of baptism, to which 
catechetical instruction is oriented, as a passage to life: 
For the mortal creature to pass to life, another 
* LK was written c. 383, i.e., in the midst of the 
mass conversions of intelligent Hellenists to Christianity 
which began with the legitimation of Christianity by 
Constantine and accelerated following the death of Julian. 
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birth had to be devised, since the first birth led only 
to a mortal existence. This second birth could neither 
begin nor end in corruption, but had to bring the one 
who was born to immortal life. (33:312) 
The Eucharist too works for divinization: 
Owing to man's twofold nature, composed as it is 
of soul and body, those who come to salvation must be 
united with the Author of their life by means of both. 
[ ... ] Now only that body in which God dwelt, 
acquired such life-giving grace; [ .•. ] our body cannot 
become immortal unless it shares in immortality by its 
association with what is immortal. 
[ ... ]He [God] unites himself with their [believ-
ers] bodies so that mankind too, by its union with what 
is immortal, may share in incorruptibility. And this he 
confers on us by the power of the blessing [i.e., the 
Eucharistic prayer], through which he changes the nature 
of the visible elements into that immortal body. 
(37:318-319) 
The role of baptism and the eucharist in the process 
of divinization is associated with the importance of 
openness to the truth of the Christian message; openness to 
that message is openness to baptism and the Eucharist and 
• 
thereby to salvation. Thus, presuppositions which obstruct 
one's acceptance of the Christian message are forms of 
disease. Such underlying ideas prevent one from enjoying 
salvation; they indirectly contribute to the hold of 
corruption upon one's life. A discussion which helps one 
overcome such salvation-thwarting presuppositions thereby 
helps one prepare for baptism. Baptism and the eucharist 
do not make sense if they are accepted apart from faith, 
i.e., apart from a sincere mind and heart; every sincere 
recipient should begin to show in her own life the nature 
50 
of divinized life offered by and celebrated in the ritual: 
if the washing has only affected the body, and the soul 
has failed to wash off the stains of passion, and the 
life after initiation is identical with that before, 
despite the boldness of my assertion I will say without 
shrinking that in such a case the water is only water, 
and the gift of the Holy Spirit is nowhere evident in 
the action. (40:324) 
This need determines the character of the catecheti-
cal instructions which prepare for baptism. Such instruc-
tions must meet a person where she is at and help her 
overcome her own particular obstacles to divinized life. 
Just as any medical therapy should be adapted to the 
particular disease it is designed to heal, so must Christ-
ian teaching be adapted to the particular intellectual 
disease it is meant to overcome: 
For we must adapt our method of therapy to the form of 
the disease. You will not heal the polytheism of the 
Greek in the same way as the Jew's disbelief about the 
only-begotten God. Nor, in the case of tJlose astray 
in heresy, will you refute their erroneous doctrinal 
inventions all in the same way. [ ••. ] we must have in 
view men's preconceptions and address ourselves to the 
error in which each is involved. (Introduction, 268-269) 
The intellectual component of catechetical discourse should 
help the person to become aware of preconceptions or 
underlying ideas which stifle the fullness of her life. 
The entirety of Gregory's LK is oriented toward helping the 
people with whom Gregory regularly dealt approach baptism 
and life in the Church properly. It is not a systematic 
treatise aimed at the discovery of truth for its own sake. 
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Whereas some forms of abstract philosophical truth may well 
be presented to a student as independent of the intellect-
ual situation or preconceptions of that student, Gregory's 
approach seems to imply that Christian truth cannot be so 
presented. There is an appropriate pluralism within the 
Christian message: 
The same method of teaching, however, is not suitable 
for everyone who approaches this word [the Christian 
message as rightly handed on in the Church]. Rather 
must we adapt religious instruction to the diversities 
of religion. While we keep in view the same objective 
in our teaching, we cannot use the same arguments in 
each case. (Ibid., 268) 
The essentially reasonable character of communion in 
the Church's life, as pointed out above, does not imply 
that the truth of the Christian message may be humanly 
comprehended or should be rationally proved. The truth 
which characterizes rational communion is the divine truth 
• 
of "the mystery of our religion." The mystery of our 
religion harmonizes with our reason by restoring it to its 
integral state and opening it, as faith, to the full range 
of truth. But this mystery exceeds what could be enjoyed 
by any intentional effort of thinking. Danielou writes: 
In the treatise Against Eunomius he [Gregory] insists 
that the "strength of Christianity" consists not in 
philosophical speculation but in the "power of regenera-
tion by faith" and in the "participation in mystical 
symbols and rites." (18) 
That truth to which we are opened is God's incomprehensible 
life itself; the mysteries of the faith make available for 
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us the incomprehensible, thus ever more sharable, fullness 
of divine life. our rationality is most properly under-
stood as a condition for the possibility of this mystery of 
our divinization, the mystery of God's abundant sharing. 
catechetical teaching which is true to its own character 
will employ reasonable argumentation only to show some 
un-divine, constricting assumption for what it is. There 
will be no pretense that that mystery can be rationally 
proved which can be enjoyed only by sharing in the tradi-
tion of the mystery. 
In sum, the catechetical character of LK is quite 
appropriate for one whose sense of truth is that of a 
constitutive element of the enjoyment of communion, even 
and especially communion in God's life, as well a means for 
the conversion necessary for that communion. The truth 
which is needed is that which opens one to a fullness of 
life (divinization) from which one is otherwise closed by 
false opinions. Nor is truth restricted to the instru-
mental role of overcoming obstacles to fullness of life 
(divinization); truth is also one component of that 
divinized life itself. Truth itself involves at least a 
hint of the presence of God, and all creatures as originat-
ed by God, in their proper incomprehensibility. 
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conclusion 
We have focused upon Gregory's own conception of the 
role of LK and of the connections among its main themes and 
its approach. The overall context is that of the diviniza-
tion (and overcoming of corruption, especially intellectual 
corruption) which God is accomplishing through Christ; in 
the Church, and especially by means of her catechetical 
teachers. Error, in this context, is the intellectual form 
taken by corruption. All basic or philosophical error is 
somehow closed to faith. Faith itself is the fulfillment 
of reason. Therefore, that which is opposed to faith will 
be, in some way, opposed also to reason. On this ground we 
may surmise that Gregory does have or could have reasonable 
criteria for discerning philosophical error. 
With this overview of LK in mind, we can proceed to 
our characterization of the dynamism of Gregory's thought 
by means of his choice of foils. We will thereby determine 
more definitely whether he has consistent criteria by which 
he recognizes error and by which he strives to explicate 
truth or whether his rejections are rationally arbitrary. 
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NOTES 
1. Whether "restoration" is an adequate portrayal of 
the process which takes place by means of the incarnation 
is subject to debate; see Balas, 151: "If [ ..• ] one real-
izes that Gregory conceived the beginning of human history 
(i.e. man before the Fall) not as a static state of 
perfection, but as a starting point for spiritual growth, 
then it will appear very questionable to attribute to him a 
conception of salvation history which would accomplish 
nothing but the restoration of that perfect state." 
2. Danielou, 14: "in man created in God's image he 
[Gregory] sees the preexistence of human nature in the 
perfection of the divine knowledge--such as it will be 
only at the end of time." Thus Danielou suggests that 
Gregory need not be read as holding that man ever actually 
enjoyed the state to which salvation "restores" him. 
3. Harvanek (49 and 69-72) treats the limits of 
epinoia (our "productive" function of intellect) and the 
transcendence of those limits by means of God's revelation 
and in mysticism. He discusses these topics in terms of 
Gregory's differences with the rationalism of Greek 
philosophers and Christian heretics. 
4. Hence Gregory explains in other works that the 
mystical flowering of faith is experienced as a darkness, 
cf. Danielou, 23-42 or Cambridge, 455. 
• 
5. Danielou, 47-55, discusses the originality of 
Gregory's notion of change as a positive reality. 
The importance of the sacraments and Church life for 
the possibilility of fruitful change is not discussed in 
depth in the secondary literature. Danielou, 18-23, 
mentions the necessity of the sacraments. Harvanek, 47-49, 
discusses Gregory's view that without the discipline of a 
Christologically derived teaching, such as is present in 
the Scriptures or the Church's teaching, our intellectual 
powers would be trapped in a mode of "free" exercise which 
could never make definite progress in truth (cf. Danielou, 
48-51, regarding the fruitless type of change). 
CHAPTER III 
Gregory's Philosophical Foils 
By means of the method of "contrastive projection", 
we will now show the orientation of Gregory's thought or 
show whether it has any rationally consistent orientation. 
our assumption is that a thinker's basic orientation is 
revealed more definitely by his philosophical foils, those 
positions against which he expends intellectual energy, 
than by his positive statements, which may or may not be 
the fruits of sufficient reflection. Furthermore, Greg-
ory's culture was rhetorical in character, continuity in 
expression rather than creativity was the rule. This 
implies that Gregory will phrase his questions and answers 
in terms of the commonplaces of his audience. This will be 
done in spite of any recognition Gregory may have had of a 
possible inappropriateness of such terms for a positive 
expression of his own thought. He was not primarily 
attempting to work out a systematic theology: he was 
attempting to meet the needs of his audience. We will thus 
use his choice of foils, rather than any expressions of his 
positive reflective theological views (which have been 
treated to some degree in the preceding chapter), as the 
surest way to uncover the basic commitments of his own 
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thought, if there are any. 
In this chapter, we will list and group the more 
important of Gregory's philosophical foils in LK. The next 
chapter will proceed from the list and grouping to charac-
terize the rationally unified, consistent set of criteria, 
if there be such, in accord with which he rejects those 
views which he finds false. If any position later recog-
nized as an essential component of orthodoxy is found among 
Gregory's foils, we will know that his basic orientation is 
against Christian orthodoxy. On the other hand, if no such 
anomaly is found, then no number of suspect positive state-
ments or inadequate hypotheses could suffice to demonstrate 
a non-Christian character to his thinking. Our method of 
contrastive projection will not yield a thoroughgoing 
account of Gregory's thought, but such is not the purpose 
of this portion of our work. Our work as a•whole will 
succeed if it determines with high surety the character of 
the philosophy toward which his thought strives. Our study 
of his chosen foils will, hopefully, display his thinking's 
effective commitments with a distinctness that justifies 
our treatment of an already well-studied topic. 
The most important foils in LK may be divided into 
four groups. Gregory attacks various forms of "ontological 
reductionism," 1) any view which attributes a deficiency or 
limitation, especially of goodness, to the nature of God or 
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2) which denies a divine image to man's nature. 3) He then 
argues against any view which treats evil as a positive 
reality. 4) Gregory attacks "epistemological reductionism" 
or any view which treats sensation or any limited frame of 
mind as if its objective correlate were the fullness of 
reality. We will now consider these foils in turn. 
"Degrading God's Nature" 
lJS is preoccupied with demonstrating that Christian 
beliefs do not "degrade God's nature" by attributing to it 
anything unworthy, e.g., any limitation characteristic of 
non-divine, finite natures: 
In reference, however, to the transcendent nature, 
everything said of it is raised to a higher degree by 
virtue of the greatness of the object. (1:270, see also 
271, 272, 2:273) 
The divine nature, not our own, must be treated as the 
• 
fullness of perfection: man 
is the image of the divine nature; and an image would 
be entirely identical with what it resembled, were it 
not in some way different from it. (21:297, see also 
35:316-7) 
Gregory treats any suggestion of a limitation to the divine 
goodness as a horrible falsity. The divine can not involve 
any imperfection (Introduction:269, thus there can not be a 
plurality of gods). Nor could God possess any perfection 
perfectly unless he possessed all perfectly (20:296-7). 
Gregory's attack upon any such degradation of the divine 
nature takes many forms. We will consider the most 
important. 
58 
1.1. If no perfection can be lacking to the divine 
nature, then a fortiori no evil (9:287, 15:291-2), nor any 
inclination toward evil (1:271), nor any origination of 
evil (5:277-8, 7:282, 30:308-9) can be attributed to God. 
1.2. Might the divine nature lack logos or reason in 
a subsistent form? Gregory rails against such a proposal 
because it would imply that divinity is inferior to human 
beings who do enjoy such reason (1:270-2). God's Logos 
must be even more, not less, subsistent than our own. 
Since God's Logos exceeds our own, even infinitely, we are 
not in a position to find divine actions wanting in reason 
(17:294-5). Our reasoning about divine matters should be 
exercised with humility. This humility is perhaps lacking 
in those whose Stoic assumptions lead to rnterpretations of 
the lateness in history of the Christian salvific events as 
a demonstration of the inefficiency and improvidence of the 
Christian God (15:291, 17:294-296). 
Likewise Gregory fights the notion that God's Logos 
could lack pneuma or spirit (2:272-3) when even humans have 
spirit. The divine Spirit could not be less subsistent 
than our own. 
1.3. Isn't the divine nature susceptible of change? 
Gregory explains why this cannot be the case. Change is 
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characteristic of creatures: 
everything that depends upon creation for its existence 
has an innate tendency to change. For the very exist-
ence of creation had its origin in change, non-being 
becoming being by divine power. (6:280, see also 
21:297-298 and 39:321-322) 
But God, by definition, has not begun to be from a "prior" 
state of non-being. Thus there is no reason to attribute 
mutability, a characteristic of creatures, to divinity. 
1.4. The import of Gregory's attack on a conception 
of the divine nature as mutable is clarified by his 
treatment of the question of whether weakness, [pathos] 
could characterize the divinity. He draws a distinction. 
He stresses that weakness, in the sense of a susceptibility 
to losing some dimension of goodness which one has, is not 
attributable to divinity. God cannot change from his 
perfection in goodness: 
With what, then, does our religion contelld the divine 
came into contact? Was it weakness in its strict 
sense, that is, evil, or was it the changing movement 
of nature? Were our teaching to affirm that the divine 
entered a state which is morally forbidden, it would be 
our duty to avoid such a preposterous doctrine, imply-
ing, as it does, an unsound view of the divine nature. 
But if we affirm that he had contact with our nature, 
which derived its original being and subsistence from 
him, in what way does the gospel proclamation fail to 
have a fitting conception of God? In our faith we 
introduce no element of weakness in our ideas of God. 
For we do not say that a doctor incurs weakness when he 
heals someone in a state of weakness. Even though he 
comes into contact with sickness, the doctor remains 
free from such weakness. (16:292-293) 
It would seem to follow that a type of weakness or of 
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change which does not compromise the perfection of divinity 
is not necessari~y opposed to divinity. This type of 
change, as will be shown soon, is one of the ways in which 
God's unchangeable goodness is realized. 
1.5. Gregory himself points out how fitting it is 
that God exercises benevolence toward us: 
[for neither should the] light [ •.• ] remain unseen, 
[n]or [the] glory unwitnessed, [n]or [his] goodness 
unenjoyed, [n]or [ ..• ] [should] any[ ... ] aspect we 
observe of the divine nature [ •.. ] lie idle[,] with no 
one to share or enjoy it. (5:276; PG 45, 21C) 
He is very clear that the appropriateness of God's benevol-
ence to us is not entailed by some necessity in the divine 
nature. Gregory does not treat necessitarian interpreta-
tions of the relation between God and creation at any great 
length, but he clearly rules out any such view: 
he who is God the Word and Wisdom and Power created 
human nature. He was not, indeed, driven by any 
necessity to form man; but out of his ab~ndant love 
he fashioned and created such a creature. (5:276) 
1.6. Gregory rules out suggestions that God lacks 
benevolence for his creatures. This is shown especially in 
God's ability, as just discussed, to bring good even out of 
the evil choices of his creatures: 
Which, then, was better? Not to have brought our nature 
into being at all, since he knew in advance that the one 
to be created would stray from the good? Or, having 
brought him into being, to restore him by repentance, 
sick as he was, to his original grace? (8:285, see also 
7:282, 12:289 for a list of God's bounties, 15:290-1, 
20:297, and 26:303-304 that even the devil is profited) 
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1.7. can God be acknowledged as perfectly good but 
ineffectual, as some human beings are? Gregory rules this 
out since it implicitly denies the perfection of any of 
God's perfections. God's power must extend to restoring 
those goods which were lost by creaturely sins: 
only the one who had originally given him [sinning man] 
life was both able and fitted to restore it when it was 
lost. (8:286) 
This power for goodness is incapable of only one sort of 
activity, evil activity; thus God can exercise his goodness 
in any good way and in any good area of reality; for God 
did not allow the fickleness of man's will to influence 
his own immutable nature with its constant purpose of 
goodness? [ ..• ] But the goodness of his intention would 
have availed nothing had not wisdom made his love of 
man effective. (20:297) 
[ .•• ] If, then, the diseased member was on earth, 
and the divine power, to preserve its own dignity, did 
not come into contact with it, its concern with crea-
tures with which we have nothing in common would not 
have benefited man. (27:305) 
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God's power is shown when he takes to himself that which he 
is not by nature as a means of healing sinners: 
that the omnipotent nature was capable of descending to 
man's lowly position is a clearer evidence of power 
than great and supernatural miracles. [ .•• God's is] 
a power which is not bounded by circumstances contrary 
to its nature. 
[ ... ]His power is clear in this: that he came in 
the likeness of man and in the lowly form of our nature. 
(24:300-301) 
1.8. This brings us to the foil which recurs most 
frequently in LK and in all the polemic literature about 
Christianity in its early centuries (and later as well): 
the divinity can not share properties of our nature; the 
purported Christian "incarnation" is impossible. Gregory 
took such challenges to the incarnation seriously: 
were our teaching to affirm that the divine entered a 
state which is morally forbidden, it would be our duty 
to avoid such a preposterous doctrine, implying, as it 
does, an unsound view of the divine nature. (16:292) 
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He defends the possibility of the incarnation of the divine 
Logos in Christ in two major steps: 1) he shows that each 
purported case of impossibility involves a false attribu-
tion of evil to something which is not evil; and 2) he 
shows the compatibility of the incarnation with God's 
perfect goodness. We have already considered this second 
step in points 1.4-6 above. Now we must consider the 
various particular cases in which Gregory responds to the 
challenge to the incarnation with his own challenge: 
Now everything we see included in the good is 
fitting to God. In consequence, either our opponents 
must show that the birth, the upbringing, the growth, 
the natural advance to maturity, the experience of 
death and the return from it are evil. Or else, if 
they concede that these things fall outside the cate-
gory of evil, they must of necessity acknowledge there 
is nothing shameful in what is alien to evil. (9:287) 
The most difficult challenges are posed by birth and 
death. Does then the birth of the incarnate one involve 
divinity in evil? In Gregory's time the birth of a 
incarnate divine being could have implied that God had 
engaged in sexual relations with the mother of the incar-
nate one. Such a view would involve the attribution of 
sexual activity to God. Sexual activity, as "sensual 
pleasure", was regarded as involved in evil: 
It is the sensual pleasure which precedes human birth 
that is weakness, and it is the impulse to evil in 
living beings that is the sickness of our nature. 
(16:293, see also 13:289) 
Thus birth usually has its origin in an activity which 
involves "weakness" in the strictly proper sense of "what 
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affects the will and perverts it toward evil and away from 
virtue" (16:292). Is the character of the sexual activity 
which precedes birth enough to show the impropriety of the 
Christian claim that the incarnate one was born? Gregory 
points out that: 
our religion teaches that God was incarnate in man, 
not that he entered a state of evil. There is only 
one way for a man to enter life, viz., to be begotten 
and brought into existence. Now our opponents [ •.• ] 
fail to realize that the whole anatomy of the body is 
uniformly to be valued, and that no factor which contri-
butes to the maintenance of life can be charged with 
being dishonorable or evil. [ .•• ]by the generative 
organs the immortality of the human race is preserved, 
and death's perpetual moves against us are, in a way, 
rendered futile and ineffectual. [ .•• ]What unfitting 
notion, then, does our religion contain, if God was 
united with human life by the very means by which our 
nature wars on death? (28:306-307) 
Sexual activity as such, then, is not inherently evil, 
although in our present state of life it may usually 
involve "weakness" in the strict sense. Furthermore 
Man begins his existence in weakness and similarly ends 
his life through weakness. But in God's case, the birth 
did not have its origin in weakness, neither did the 
death end in weakness. For sensual pleasure did not 
precede the birth. (13:289) 
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of course, the gospel teaches that the conception and birth 
of the incarnate occurred not only without sexual activity 
motivated by "weakness", but without any sexual activity. 
such a birth was free from evil: 
If birth in itself is not weakness, one cannot 
call life weakness. It is the sensual pleasure which 
precedes human birth that is weakness, and it is the 
impulse to evil in living beings that is the sickness 
of our nature. But our religion claims He was pure 
from both of these. If, then, his birth was free from 
sensual plesure and his life from wickedness, what 
weakness remains for God to have shared in, according 
to our devout religion? (16:293) 
His birth was beyond natural powers: 
while he was born, he transcended our nature[ ... ] in 
manner of birth[ .•. ]. It would be consistent for you 
to refuse to think of him as a mere man[ ... ]. (13:290) 
Even if it is granted that birth is not incompatible 
with divinity, "the birth makes the death necessary" 
(32:309). Is death itself compatible with divinity? 
Surely God is most fully alive? Mortality as such must not 
be evil if it is to be compatible with divinity. Whence 
came death to us and for what purpose? Death 
is the characteristic mark of irrational nature; and in 
His care for man, He who heals our wickedness subseq-
uently provided him with the capacity to die, but not 
to die permanently. (8:283) 
Though death can terrify one who judges matters from the 
viewpoint of pleasures and pains (8:282), Gregory points 
out that it will be grasped by the one who loves reason as 
a means for separating our good natures from their evil 
accretions. Thus death itself is not evil; it is not 
therefore incompatible with divinity. There is nothing 
contradictory when: 
We hold that God was involved in both these 
changes of our nature, by which the soul is united to 
the body and separated from it. (16:293) 
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As stated above, the weakness [pathos] which characterizes 
our lives is, strictly speaking, only "what affects the 
will and perverts it toward evil" (16:292). An incarnation 
of the divine Logos in such weakness is impossible. But 
this does not show the impossibility of an incarnation of 
divinity into the human network of mutual dependence. 
Death is an element of that human network of mutual 
connectedness. As there is nothing inherently evil in the 
latter, there is no reason to deny the incarnation, with 
the death it involved, on such a count. 
Even prudent, benevolent trickery is ftot incompatible 
with incarnate divinity, since in the "angle and bait" 
theme, God 
made use of a deceitful device [the incarnation's 
concealment of divinity from the devil] to save the one 
who had been ruined. (26:303) 
In short, since 
our human life [ ... ] from beginning to end and through-
out was stained with sin. [ ... ] the power which amends 
our nature had to reach to both points. [ ... ]the 
beginning and [ ... ]the end, covering all that lies 
between. (27:304) 
The incarnation meets the problem where it is: in the 
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totality of human life including death (32:310). The 
objection of reason would be to a purported divinity which 
sought to meet the problem with inadequate or irrelevant 
means, rather than to the Christian notion of incarnation. 
1.9. Gregory, having established the non-impossibil-
ity of an incarnation, treats related objections. Wouldn't 
God lose his divinity by a union with humanity? For 
example, would not an incarnate divinity be bodily circum-
scribed? Gregory retorts that even human beings are not 
bodily circumscribed (10:287-8). Furthermore, Jesus' deeds 
cannot be accounted for by natural human powers (13:289-90, 
32:310). Divine apatheia is not lost but manifested by 
taking on the weakness [pathos] and changes which are 
proper to our good nature in its present state: 
In our faith we introduce no element of weakness in 
our ideas of God. For we do not say that a doctor 
incurs weakness when he heals someone in.a state of 
weakness. Even though he comes into contact with 
sickness, the doctor remains free from such 
weakness. (16:292-3) 
1.10. A final foil for Gregory is the view that the 
transcendent God is less distant from the heavens and 
purely spiritual beings than from our human nature. 
Gregory points out that God is infinitely beyond any 
created nature: 
what is totally inaccessible [save by revelation to 
faith] is not accessible to one thing and inaccessible 
to another. Rather does it transcend all existing 
things in equal degree. Earth is not more below his 
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dignity, and heaven less. [ ... ]Otherwise we could not 
conceive of the power that governs the universe as 
equally pervading all things. [ .•• ] from these differ-
ences of more and less, the divine nature would appear 
to be composite [ •.. ]. (27:305) 
The transcendence of God in relation to all creatures is 
implied in the notion of God as perfectly good and not 
merely sharing in goodness. 
In sum, any notion which detracts from God's perfec-
tion, including his power regarding that which he is not by 
nature, is attacked by Gregory as irrational. 
Degrading Human Nature 
The next set of foils in LK concerns human nature. 
Gregory opposes the attribution of any limitations to man's 
nature which would imply that our creator is other than God 
(8:285, 28:306) or that God has destined us to be less than 
his images or to enjoy less than a participation in the 
divine life (5:276-77, 6:279, 21:297) or to be incapable of 
revealing or transmitting divinity (32:310, 33-34:313-4, 
36:318, 37:320 on the world's "eucharistic-ability"). In 
short, human nature is thoroughly good (9:287, 15:292). 
2.1. Could human beings naturally lack immortality? 
Gregory opposes this since it would imply that we lacked 
that kinship with the divine by which we could come "to 
enjoy God's goodness" (5:276). 
2.2. Could human beings naturally lack free will, 
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especially regarding the state of their spiritual life 
(and, in effect, rebirth)? Gregory responds that 
were human life governed by necessity, the "image" [of 
God] would be falsified in that respect and so differ 
from the archetype. For how can a nature subject to 
necessity and in servitude be called an image of the 
sovereign nature? What, therefore, is in every respect 
made similar to the divine, must certainly possess free 
will and liberty by nature, so that participation in 
the good may be the reward of virtue. (5:277) 
The decisions of creaturely free will are respected even by 
God (22:298-9). Without free will's cooperation, baptism 
is useless (40:324, see also 38-39:321). 
2.3. Could human beings be satisfied by a total 
release from embodiment, such that we would not be con-
strained by the limits of bodily life? Gregory refuses to 
grant that human life is in need of an elimination of its 
embodiment as such. He grants that the present state of 
our embodiment leaves much to be desired. But we could not 
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be satisfied until "our sentient and bodily nature" is 
"freed from its opposite [evils from sin]"; "he [God] will 
remold it by the resurrection, and will reconstitute the 
vessel into its original beauty" (8:284). God 
does not prevent the soul's separation from the body by 
death in accordance with the inevitable course of 
nature. But he brings them together again by the 
resurrection. Thus he becomes the meeting point of both, 
of death and of life. In himself he restores the nature 
which death has disrupted, and becomes himself the 
principle whereby the separated parts are reunited. 
(16:294) 
2.4. But wouldn't it be a great deficiency on man's 
part if he could not save himself? Gregory acknowledges 
that man is, by his own consent, trapped in evil: 
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it was not possible for him to be discreet, once he had 
turned from discretion, or to form any wise decision 
once he had departed from wisdom. (8:286) 
By his own power man cannot escape from the "labyrinth" 
(35:315) of death. It would be a great shortcoming in 
God's creative accomplishment if there were no other way by 
which man could come to enjoy his share in God's life. Of 
course, as already treated, by the incarnation God can 
restore man to that from which man turned. Thus by means 
of baptism, man's spirit can be restored (5:317). Man can 
receive bodily restoration toward immortality by the divine 
remedy of the eucharistic body of the immortal one (37:-
318). By faith in God, the immortal one and source of any 
share in immortality, man is not lacking in the "means" by 
which to enjoy the immortality lost by sin: • 
Of what, then, will one who considers his own interest 
carefully choose to be the child: of a nature observed 
to be mutable or of one which is unchanging and stable 
and consistently good? (39:322) 
In short, many thinkers view human reality as 
incapable of receiving and enjoying a share in the divine 
life. Many hold that man's nature does not image divine 
reality since it is manifest that man's present state is 
pervaded by evil. These views are rejected by Gregory. 
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Identifying Any Natural Reality with Evil 
Another of Gregory's prominent themes is the polemic 
against those who degrade any natural reality (9:287) by 
identifying it as evil. 
3.1. Must not anyone with intellectual honesty admit 
that the natural workings of our world and its arrangement 
are fatally (literally, oriented toward death) flawed? 
Gregory regards such a view as specious (1:271). He holds 
that every natural aspect of the world can share in the 
immortality involved in divine fellowship. He specifies 
how humanity allows the entirety of the world's nature to 
share divinization. God's purpose is that: 
no part fails to share in the divine fellowship. 
On this account the divine nature produces in 
man a blending of the intelligible and the sensible. 
(6:279, see also 37:318) 
3.2. But does not change always involve a loss of 
• possessed goodness? Surely change necessarily partakes of 
evil? Gregory challenges this and holds that only one type 
of changes, sinful changes, are inherently evil. Change 
itself is a characteristic of all created natures as they 
come from their creator. Thus it can be for the better: 
Now that alone is unchangeable by nature which 
does not originate through creation. But whatever is 
derived from the uncreated nature has its subsistence 
out of nonbeing. Once it has come into being through 
change, it constantly proceeds to change. If it acts 
according to its nature, this continual change is for 
the better. But if it is diverted from the straight 
path, there succeeds a movement in the opposite 
direction. (8:286) 
Nor is there any necessary limit to the goodness to which 
positive, non-sinful, changes lead: 
Now change is a perpetual movement toward a 
different state. And it takes two forms. In the one 
case it is always directed toward the good; and here 
its progress is continual, since there is no conceiv-
able limit to the distance it can go. In the other 
case it is directed toward the opposite, the essence 
of which lies in nonexistence. (21:298) 
Change itself, then, is a characteristic of the creatures 
which come from the perfectly good God. It cannot be 
identified with evil. 
3.3. Many thinkers and even religious figures 
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challenged the goodness of human nature, especially due to 
its embodiment and its consequent "weakness." We have 
already seen Gregory's defence of the goodness of human 
nature and its natural aspects. He defends birth (13:290, 
28:307) and even death or mortality (8:282-3, 32:309-310). 
Nor are the punishments and pains by which we are weaned 
from evil and restored to our share in divinity to be 
equated with evil (8:284-5). 
In sum, evil is not the nature of any created 
reality, much less the nature of the creator. It is the 
privation of virtue: 
no blame, indeed, would attach to evil, could it 
claim God as its creator and father. But evil in some 
way arises from within. It has its origin in the will, 
when the soul withdraws from the good. For as sight is 
an activity of nature and blindness is a privation of 
natural activity, so virtue is in this way opposed to 
vice. For the origin of evil is not otherwise to be 
conceived than as the absence of virtue. (5:277-278) 
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Thus evil is more opposed to any positive reality than any 
positive reality differs from any other positive reality: 
we must not think of virtue as opposed to vice in the 
way of two existing phenomena. To illustrate: nonbeing 
is opposed to being; but we cannot say that the former 
is opposed to the latter as something eisting in its 
own right. Rather do we say that there is a logical 
opposition between what does not exist and what exists. 
In the same way vice is opposed to the principle of 
virtue. (6:279 see also 7:282, 8:286, 15:291) 
In short, evil as such is nothing positive at all. 
Epistemological Reductionism 
The last set of foils in LK which are important for 
our purpose deal with the varying degrees in which human 
attitudes are open to the fullness of reality. Metaphysi-
cal views are generally correlated with appropriate 
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epistemological views. We have just considered some of 
Gregory's attacks on metaphysical views which deny some 
dimension of reality and present a part or aspect as if it 
were the whole. Now we will take up his challenge to the 
parallel epistemologies. He challenges the acceptance of 
any "finite" attitude of mind as unrestricted. God has 
created human beings to enjoy nothing less than his own 
divine life. There must then be a human attitude of mind 
in which God's infinity is accessible. We might compare a 
73 
finite attitude to looking at the world through rose 
colored glasses. The problem arises when one wearing such 
glasses asserts that what he sees and only that is real. 
Gregory points up the limits in some attitudes which are 
often taken as unrestricted. 
4.1. Many thinkers implicitly or explicitly identi-
fied the nature of the real with the object of sensation. 
Gregory attacked such identifications as improper; they 
deny much that is real (7:281-282, 8:283 & 285). 
4.2. Furthermore, Gregory rails against identifying 
the nature of the real with that nature perceived by anyone 
whose mind is not perfectly open to all truth. We have 
already seen (p. 45) that Gregory regards faith as the sole 
attitude of mind and heart which is unrestrictedly open.* 
Gregory engages in standard rhetorical slurring of those 
who do not accept faith after his demonstra~ion of the 
falsity of their objections to faith. Gregory's "slurs" 
have a consistency about them which suggests that they may 
have substantial content. Those who do not accept faith 
are "unreasonable and shortsighted" (8:285), "little minds" 
afflicted with "stupidity" (9:287) who "strongly oppose the 
truth", who suffer "madness" "for their own deceit" 
* Danielou, 31, as mentioned earlier, quotes Gregory's 
Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles in this regard: 
"when I gave up every finite mode of comprehension, then it 
was that I found my Beloved by faith." 
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(18:295). They are people who take "too narrow a view of 
things", and are are "so simple-minded as not to believe" 
(25:302), and "narrow minded" (27:305); "they look only at 
outward appearances" and are "very stubborn" (33:312). 
It is interesting that Gregory reproaches unbelievers 
for their failures in reason! He does not attack them for 
refusing to abdicate their rationality, but for having 
abdicated it under the guise of giving it free rein. Those 
who restrict the range and depth of their minds and hearts, 
will necessarily miss enjoyment of something of God's 
perfection, something of the world's goodness. They will 
end in denials of the possibility of that by which restora-
tion is alone possible, because their attitudes are not 
"infinite." Only an unrestrictedly open attitude can do 
justice to reality since reality has infinity about it . 
• 
Conclusion 
Gregory's philosophical foils comprise various ways of 
overlooking some positive reality, such as God's unlimited 
nature, or the value of some positive reality. He opposes 
any confusion between the present state of created things 
and their nature. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Character of Gregory's Thinking as 
Determined by Constrastive Projection 
The presentation and grouping of Gregory's foils in 
the previous chapter provides the material with which to 
characterize the basic criteria which guide his thought. 
our review of the secondary literature showed that Gregory 
employs some opinions and concepts which are perhaps 
inconsistent with a thorough orthodoxy, especially his 
occasional references to human embodiment as incompatible 
with spiritual growth. Yet Gregory upholds the orthodox 
teaching of the need for and goodness of the resurrection 
of the body. Is his rejection of the denial of the 
resurrection of the body based on any reasonable grounds? 
Or does he lack intellectual integrity? • Has Gregory the 
thinker capitulated to Gregory the bishop (or to the pious 
women in his family, as Cherniss suggests)? our question 
is thus whether or not Gregory's thinking is oriented by a 
consistent and reasonable concern. We will respond to this 
question by identifying the concern - the set of criteria -
which guides Gregory's rejection in LK of various philo-
sophically important foils. We will then project the 
character of the philosophy at which Gregory's thinking 
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aims, even if he did not explicate many elements of that 
philosophy. Finally, we will evaluate the compatibility of 
the basic concern of his thought with his Christian faith. 
Contrastive Projection of His Thought's Basic Concern 
Gregory's choice of philosophical foils reveals a 
preoccupation with refusing unnecessary limitations, 
whether in thought or life. This basic concern of Greg-
ory's thought is manifest in his effort to hold together 
two contrasts which were often collapsed into one or the 
other. It is important to stress that the difference of 
spirit from matter is not one of the contrasts which guides 
his critical thought. Rather, these basic contrasts are 
the difference of infinite and finite and the opposition 
between evil and good. He sees that a collapse of one into 
the other jeopardizes both what he regards as an authentic 
notion of infinity and also the authentic meaning of evil. 
His thought is a quite consistent effort to balance these 
two contrasts without reducing either to the other. 
Given Gregory's predilection for Plato's insistence 
upon the radical difference of spirit from matter, even 
while he appropriates Aristotelean themes in the fashion of 
his time, it is striking that his concerns are not focused 
upon the difference of matter and spirit. He often uses 
the distinction of matter from spirit, but he uses it in 
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the context of his treatment of the two options available 
to spiritual creatures and the context of infinite goodness 
in which such options occur. He emphasizes the basic 
goodness of the bodily world and all its characteristics. 
Even those human characteristics, such as pain, death, and 
sexual differentiation, which would not have existed had 
not God foreseen the effects of sin in the world and 
designed our nature so as to circumvent those effects, are 
defended against any characterization as evil. Likewise, 
he def ends the weakness and changes characteristic of 
humanity even apart from sin against charges that they are 
inherently evil. He insists that the immortality for which 
we hope and which has been made available by the Incarna-
tion is not solely a spiritual immortality. It seems to be 
his view that we possess an immortality of soul with or 
without the Incarnation. The Incarnation, ~f appropriated 
in faith, makes possible the integral immortality which 
includes human embodiment, human knowledge and strength of 
will. This restoration is, perhaps, the preeminent sign of 
infinite goodness. 
Gregory deals with the body/spirit topics because he 
is concerned to elucidate, insofar as is possible or called 
for, the implications of infinity and especially the 
possibilities inherent in infinite goodness. He vigorously 
opposes any reduction of infinity to finitude; thus he 
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insists on the possibility of and the means whereby 
creatures, especially human creatures, may enjoy unlimited 
divine goodness. The possibility and reality of human 
divinization is crucial in Gregory's thought because its 
denial is perhaps the greatest challenge to his belief in 
the power, goodness, wisdom and justice of God. If God's 
goodness cannot accomplish human divinization, even in the 
face of human sin, then there is no argument against an 
ultimate collapse of finitude into evil as well as a 
complete separation of God from creation. The "infinity" 
that would remain after such a collapse would be a false 
infinite, an un-actualized and un-actualizable ideal. 
Pagan Greek thought is probably centered on such a 
false infinite.* A necessitarianism is evident in its 
treatment of the ideal or most concrete form of knowledge 
as science, i.e., as aimed at the grasp of ,,ecessary 
connections. Since metaphysical views are logically 
correlated with epistemological views, a necessitarian 
epistemology implies a necessitarian metaphysics. Thus, 
* Clarke's "The Limitation of Act by Potency" details 
the classical Greek equation of perfection with the 
(de) finite rather than the in(de)finite. He attributes to 
Nee-Platonism the advance to associating infinitude with 
perfection and finitude with deficiency in perfection. On 
185 he notes that Gregory's treatment of God as infinite is 
not traditional within Christian circles. 
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the real is that which is necessary in terms of itself.* 
While LK does mention that God "was not, indeed, 
driven by any necessity to form man" (5:276), it does not 
contain an attack on the necessitarianism of Greek thought 
as such. Gregory's interests were not philosophical in a 
technical sense. But Gregory's exploration of the implica-
tions of authentic infinity could surely help both clarify 
the character of necessitarianism and criticize it. Let us 
suggest how Gregory's emphasis can clarify it. His 
distinctions can highlight the connection between necessi-
tarianism and the failure of the pagan Greeks to discover 
the notion of creation ex nihilo and the possibility of 
divine free choice implied by such creation. 
Furthermore, Gregory's exploration of the implica-
tions of infinity could be developed into a criticism of 
• necessitarianism, to an exposition of its lack of neces-
sity. For example, metaphysically, there is no rational 
necessity to restrict one who is infinitely perfect from, 
e.g., creating others ex nihilo by free choice for divini-
zation. There is no necessity that such a creation occur, 
but there is no necessity that it not. Likewise in 
* It would take us far beyond the limits of our 
thesis to make these comments more precise. We refer the 
interested reader to a brief expansion in Robert Sokolow-
ski, The God of Faith and Reason (Notre Dame, IN: U of ND, 
1982), chapter two, "Pagan Divinity", pp. 12-20. 
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epistemology, there is no necessity to treat scientific 
knowledge as most concrete; a faith is possible which 
yeilds what is darkness from a "necessitarian" scientific 
attitude, but which is more concrete, or "infinite" than 
such science. And in ethics (or the phenomenoloy of 
action), there is no need to explain away free choice; free 
choice is impossible only for necessitarianism. With an 
authentic notion of infinity one can make sense of free 
choice, whether for good (as creation) or for evil (as 
creaturely sin). Nor is it necessary to despair at the 
occurrence of sin; since it is the effect of a finite 
activity, it can be overcome, from within, by an act of 
infinite gratuitous goodness. Without an authentic notion 
of infinity - such as that which Gregory safeguards -
creation, free choice, faith and salvation from radical 
evils could not be understood except as im~ossibilities. 
Gregory's concern with the implications of infinite 
goodness are also worked out in his positive view of the 
change, weakness, and materiality implicated in the 
Incarnation. Each of these finitudes can be attributed to 
God. Of course, change, weakness, or embodiment, or 
anything finite cannot be attributed to God's own nature. 
But, and this is striking, they can be attributed to God in 
his benevolence toward us in the Incarnation. We cannot 
rightly reduce God to that which he is necessarily or by 
nature. Though God cannot act against his nature, that 
nature, infinite goodness, is such as to allow for possi-
bilities beyond its necessary actuality. God can be 
involved in true relationships with what is not himself.* 
These "additional" attributes do not fill out any lack in 
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the infinitely perfect nature of God, since, by definition, 
there is no lack in infinite perfection. The attributes of 
creator and incarnate savior which God acquires by his 
choice to create and save us are non-necessary, though 
quite reasonable, gratuitous characteristics. Weakness, 
change, and materiality can characterize the natures only 
of beings which are not necessary; but they can even 
characterize that whose nature is necessary. This is 
implied in a consistent notion of infinite good . 
A Pluralistic, Personalistic Theism • 
Gregory's basic concern with the difference of 
infinite and finite and the opposition of good and evil 
leads toward a philosophical personalism, theism, and 
pluralism. It is beside the point that Gregory has not 
provided the detailed philosophical analyses undertaken by 
* Clarke's "What is Most and Least Relevant in the 
Metaphysics of st. Thomas Today?", pp.432-433, argues that 
Aquinas' denial that God has "real relations" to creatures 
is consistent with the view offered here as Gregory's. 
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twentieth century thinkers.* His concerns, as manifested 
in his choice of foils, show that such views, or at least a 
number of their themes, are demanded by the direction of 
his thought. How is this the case? 
Gregory's thought heads toward a personalism because 
one of its constitutive contrasts, that of evil and good, 
is attributable only to persons, i.e, beings with free 
will. Gregory's insistence upon God's respect for crea-
turely choices demonstrates how seriously he took free will 
as revealing the character of man. As pointed out above, 
this differentiates Gregory's thought from the pagan Greek 
failure to focus clearly on the notion of free choice. 
Pagan ethics treated man not as person but as citizen 
(whose actions were evaluated accordingly as praiseworthy 
or blameworthy) of a polis or of the cosmos • 
• Gregory's thought must be both theistic and pluralis-
tic since evil is a possibility only for created persons, 
i.e., beings whose existing is the result of the "change" 
* We might mention Martin Buber's I and Thou (NY: 
Scribners, 1970), E. Levinas' Totality and Infinity 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 1969), Vincent Miceli's Ascent to 
Being: Gabriel Marcel's Philosophy of Communion (NY: 
Desclee, 1965), E. Mounier's Personalism (Notre Dame, IN: 
U of ND), and John MacMurray's Persons in Relation (Atlan-
tic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1979). 
The Cappadocian characterization of the Trinitarian 
hypostases as relations (see p. 37-38 above) could be seen 
as the germ of a new personalist, metaphysical theory of 
categories. The germ is merely a germ; it is not developed 
in the areas of creaturely relationships. 
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of creation. His focus on the difference of evil from good 
would make no sense if there were none of the beings to 
which it applies, created beings. Whether these creatures 
are human or hyper-human does not much affect Gregory's 
basic concerns; both are finite, good by nature, but by 
nature capable of evil. For there to be finite beings 
there must be a creator, a divine being which is infinitely 
good and perfect. Hence Gregory's theism is consistent 
with his rational concerns. And if creaturely evil is a 
possibility, creatures must have the power of self-deter-
mination in their relation to God. They could not be 
merely passing stages of a Neo-Platonically conceived 
divine emanation process, nor merely the Stoic seminal 
logoi striving for the unconnected resignation of the Sage 
in the course of cosmic cycles, nor merely an Aristotelian 
• 
virtuous contemplative operating by his natural power. 
Rather creatures are respected in their differences by God 
without thereby detracting anything from God - hence 
Gregory's pluralism coheres with his critical criteria. 
In sum, Gregory's foils manifest that his critical 
thought is guided by a consistent set of criteria. His 
basic demand is that justice be done to the difference of 
good and evil, to the difference of infinite and finite, 
and to the irreducibility of these pairs to each other. 
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Evaluation and Conclusion 
Gregory's concern to consistently uphold the differ-
ence of finite from infinite marks him unambiguously as a 
Christian thinker. Gregory's foils constantly manifest his 
concern for avoiding any reduction of the infinite to 
something finite. His focus upon the possibility of human 
divinization shows an ethics or theory of human nature in 
harmony with respect for authentic infinity (see the 
footnote on p. 47 above). His positive emphasis on faith 
as our mode of access to the divine extends this concern to 
epistemological matters: faith is, as Danielou's quotations 
from Gregory's other works show, the mode of our openness 
to infinity; attitudes other than faith are thus character-
ized as "finite" (see the footnote on p. 45 above). 
Why was Gregory's central concern, as manifested in 
his foils, overlooked by the thinkers who regard his 
thinking as non-Christian? 
Cherniss focuses upon Gregory's use of the contrast 
of spirit and matter and interprets the entirety of 
Gregory's thought accordingly (p. 4-6 above); he thereby 
misses Harvanek's point (p. 14-15 above) that Gregory's 
central concern is the difference of creature from creator, 
i.e., of the finite from the infinite. 
Harnack notes two poles in Gregory's thought, but 
those two poles are the Aristotelian concern for the unity 
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of soul and body and the Platonic concern for the spirit's 
irreducibility to the material (p. 6 above). Nowhere does 
Harnack avert to Gregory's central concern with the 
difference of finite from infinite (which is not the same 
as matter from spirit) or with the opposition of evil and 
good (which is also not identified with body and spirit). 
Harnack's liberal Protestant and essentially individualist 
disgust with Gregory's sacramental realism (pp. 6-7 above) 
is akin to the disgust felt by many of the proponents of 
Gregory's foils regarding the unworthiness of materiality 
in reference to divinity. 
Nygren does not note Gregory's characterization of 
faith as receptive and as the only mode in which we can 
enjoy the approach of the unapproachable; certainly he 
misses the harmony of Gregory's notion of faith and his 
concern with the implications of infinity, i:t.nd the "agapa-
ic" God thereby defended. There is no basic disagreement 
between Gregory and Nygren on the character and role of 
faith. But Gregory's attempt to reconcile a purified form 
of eros is at odds with Nygren's Lutheran a priori view 
that agape is irreconcilable with any form of eros (p. 8 
above). Gregory, in effect, would suggest that Nygren 
limits God's ability to fashion creatures in his own image 
and to help them actualize that image-character by restora-
tion from sin. This, of course, is a difference between 
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Gregory and Nygren about what is authentic Christianity. 
Stead tends to approach Gregory's works as if they 
were definitive expressions of a basically theoretical 
thought. He overlooks the apologetic, rhetorical, and 
catechetical intent of most of Gregory's works, of even the 
most controversial. As a result he lacks the context in 
which to properly relate the various contrasts which 
Gregory uses. He treats the difference of perceptible from 
intelligible (or matter from spirit) as of equal importance 
to that of creature from creator (or finite from infinite) 
(p. 9-10 above). He accuses Gregory of an "uncritical 
borrowing" of concepts; this accusation does not hold up if 
our study of Gregory's foils is to the point. Gregory knew 
quite well the limits of the concepts which he borrowed, 
and he highlighted those limits. 
In conclusion, a summary of our results is in order. 
Some critics have cast doubt on the rationality of Grego-
ry's thought because he rejects concepts which had been 
condemned by the Church while he uses concepts which are 
logically associated with the condemned. They suggest 
that Gregory criticizes concepts on fideistic or irrational 
grounds. To determine whether they are correct we asked 
whether there is evidence of rational criteria (i.e. more 
than a fideistic adherence to Church teaching) in Gregory's 
critical thought. Chapter Two presented Gregory's positive 
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conception of the relation between the truth of Christian 
faith and the character of philosophical error; his 
"reasonable" conception of faith made it appear likely that 
he does have rational criteria. Chapter Three listed and 
grouped his philosophical foils. This chapter has identi-
fied his central concern as manifested in his choice of 
foils. It is to safeguard the difference of infinite and 
finite and the distinct difference of good and evil. Once 
identified it should be clear that that concern - that set 
of criteria - is consistent, reasonable and in accord with 
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